“Concrete Attack by Corium” says rare English-language model in 200 page Tepco handout from Nov. 30 — “Time to Rupture”? (PHOTOS)

Published: December 1st, 2011 at 12:14 am ET
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Source: handouts_111130_09-j.pdf (application/pdf Object)

Date: Nov. 30, 2011

Containment Modeling, Page 1-46, 1-47 (85, 86 of 207)

Pg. 85: Concrete Attack by Corium

Pg. 86: Time to Rupture

Published: December 1st, 2011 at 12:14 am ET
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96 comments to “Concrete Attack by Corium” says rare English-language model in 200 page Tepco handout from Nov. 30 — “Time to Rupture”? (PHOTOS)

  • 3. Fukushima first nuclear power plant No.2
    3.1 MAAP analysis analysis conditions
    Conditions a major analysis of table 4 plant conditions, table 5-display event event
    To do.
    Analysis of the following two cases, is also about the leak from the vessel.
    Keep under the assumption that analysis.
    (1) Analysis of cases
    3/14 19:54-Sea note, as stated in table 5 for no. 2,
    Water has started, after pouring water amount and conduct analysis of 2 cases:
    Hoops.
    [Part 1]: an analysis of solving entire reactor water level to the actual measurements (intermediate extent of reactor core)
    To fit the measured at the discharge side of the fire pump pouring water flow than small
    To assume that licked.
    [2]: Water water meter is accurate, that turned out to be no. 1 water meter calibration
    Not shown, not to maintain reactor water reactor Division
    Solving like water, maintaining core of less analysis as
    Pouring water quantity of less than pouring water flow was measured at the discharge side of the fire pumps
    To assume.
    (2) Vapor from the containment leakage assume full
    Value of storage vessel pressure measured in real analysis, had put together some
    Second, approximately 21 hours after the earthquake-leakage from the transition zone in containment ( D/W ) care ( about
    10 Cm ø ) assumed. Also, as well as the pressure control room of 3 / 15 (hereinafter referred to as “S/C”)
    -Leakage from the transition zone in containment ( S/C ) of noise near the boundary ( approx. 10 mm
    cm ) assumed.
    However, only an assumption of the analysis on the leakage was from a containment is actually
    The analysis and measurement values by problems on the Keiki or inconsistent at the moment unclear
    There.

    Attachment 1-13


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  • Table 4 No. 2 machine plant conditions
    Item condition
    Early reactors 2381 MWt (rating output) output
    7.3 The initial reactor pressure MPa abs (normal operating pressure)
    Early reactors water normal level
    RPV node split reference figure 6
    Enable core node split number 5 node radial:
    Axis 10-node:
    Coated pipe damage to 1000 K temperature
    Core node 2500 K melting point
    Store container model reference material Figure 7
    Store the container space volume D/W 4240 m 3 space:
    S/C space: 3160 m 3
    サプレッション tourbograph 2980 m 3 water
    Decay heat ANSI/ANS5.1-1979 model
    (Assuming the end of equilibrium reactor burnup)


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  • Table 5 No. 2 machine events events
    Legend 1: records and decrease: based on the record estimated □: analysis on hypothetical
    Analysis criteria
    No on analysis events
    Category notes
    If Yes: where to record
    Decrease the []‘s if: basis assuming the estimated
    1 / 3 11 14:46 Earthquake-occurring-
    2 14:47 Reactor Scrum-5 16, report 4 driving diary of duty long land revaluation journal
    3 15:02 RCIC manual-start 5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline
    4 15:28 ( L-8 ) RCIC trip-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline
    5 15:41 All AC power loss • 5 / 16 report 4 driving diary of duty long land revaluation journal
    6 3/12 4:20

    5:00
    Decrypt-RCIC water pressure water tank
    The switching-control room
    5 / 16 Report 7 various operations proven streamline
    7 3 14 13:25 RCIC stop-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline
    8 16:34 Nuclear reactor pressure vessel pressure ( SRV1 valve opening ) operation
    Start

    5 / 16 Report 7 various operations proven streamline
    Seawater injection work-line of fire extinguishing systems using 16:34
    Open

    5 / 16 Report 7 various operations proven streamline ※ 1
    9 18:00
    Around
    Reactor pressure decline confirmation

    5 / 16 Report 7 various operations proven streamline
    10 Fire pump is out of fuel 19:20 stop-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline ※ 1
    11 19:54 Fire pump starts-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline ※ 1 2
    19:57 Fire pump second boot-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline ※ 1

    Attachment 1-15


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  • 12 21: 20 By SRV2 valve opening pressure, water reactor
    To recover

    5 / 16 Report 7 various operations proven streamline ※ 1
    13 23:00
    Around
    Assuming the SRV1 valve closed

    23 That SRV1 valve closed at the time from the rise of nuclear reactor pressure
    Assumptions.
    14 3/15 6:14
    Around
    And noise cause pressure near the control room
    Also on the reduce pressure in the room

    Tokyo electric power HP(http://www.tepco.co.jp/index-j.html ) of press
    ※ 1 Seawater pouring water start date information 3 / 14 stop fire pump with a 19:20 record from Aru, 3 / 14 16:34 pouring some water made available
    In the resolution of water rise in the then confirmed analysis on 3 / 14 assume first seawater pouring water start pouring water from the 19:54.
    2 Pouring water flow and timing of the pouring water flow changes to about 7 different operations proven streamline ( 5 / 16 report ) of based on how much pouring water to date each furnace, daily average flow rate
    And do not exceed the amount of pouring water.
    Attachment 1-16


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  • 3.2 MAAP analysis analysis results
    3.2.1 Analysis case [1] the analysis results
    Results of the analysis of cases [1] as shown in table 6.
    Table 6 Summary of no. 2 machine analysis results [1]
    Item analysis
    Approximately 75 hours, reactor exposure start time occurs after earthquake
    Reactor core damage started hours after an earthquake at about 77 hours
    Reactor pressure vessel damage time

    (Unsuccessful in this analysis to damage to nuclear reactor pressure vessel)
    About analysis results [1] described below.
    After stopping the RCIC reactor water level is gradually decreased, reactor, and exposed SRV
    Reactor will be completely exposed by opening the reactor core damage starts ( figure 6 reference ).
    Almost at the same time start pouring water showed measurements in analysis of reactor water
    Place from doing analysis and pouring water amount commensurate with the assumption, pouring water amount
    Well, not, be maintained around the core area is half submerged. For this reason, furnace
    Mind would be damaged.
    Reactor pressure, while for stopping the RCIC SRV hydraulic pressure near at high pressure state
    To be maintained. Nuclear reactor and reduced rapidly by SRV opening of RCIC stop after the
    After that down to atmospheric pressure.
    Reactor pressure measurements had less analysis than RCIC operation period.
    And, リークパス to S/C may was formed through the SRV, net
    When the leak was, instrument problems is unknown at this time. Open since the SRV
    The behavior and are agreed and analytical measurement value ( Figure 7 references ).


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  • Rise in reactor storage tank pressure is due to the rise in the surface temperature サプレッション tourbograph, Atom
    Assume the leak from the reactor containment vessel ( D/W ), similar to measurements and earthquake
    D/W pressure rise from occurring and dull. Then, one by the opening of the 3 / 14 SRV
    Rise in pressure over time, storing vessel pressure then changes tend to decrease in measurements.
    And when it comes. Boundary noise in the analysis of observed near the S/C 3 / 15, S/C care
    Leakage occurs in the transition zone to assume conducted analysis ( Figure 8 reference ).
    Is part of the reactor No. 2 machine stays in the reactor core of molten pool exist, nuclear
    Was enough of the reactor pressure vessel damage results. This is a note early RCIC
    1-Time Flooder RCIC stop, that the water was relatively continuously


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  • 3.2.2 Analysis case [2] analysis results
    Table 7 shows the results of the analysis of cases [2].
    Table 7 summary of no. 2 machine analysis results [2]
    Item analysis
    Approximately 75 hours, reactor exposure start time occurs after earthquake
    Reactor core damage started hours after an earthquake at about 77 hours
    Reactor pressure vessel damage hours after an earthquake at about 109 hours
    About analysis results [2] described below.
    RCIC stopped after the reactor water level decreased gradually, reactor, and exposure to SRV release
    More core and became completely exposed, to start the reactor core damage. Almost at the same time note
    Amount of pouring water but water starts, assuming is not enough to enable fuel rod bottom more than
    The exasperating ( figure 10 reference ).
    Reactor pressure reactor migrating lower plenum pressure since, when using SRV DEP.
    Students about the behavior of other found temporary pressure due to steam to increase
    [1] The show nearly as well as behavior analysis and ( Figure 11 reference ).
    Reactor storage tank pressure during nuclear reactor pressure, as well as migrating bottom plenum
    Temporary pressure due to steam to increase seen in the behavior of other recently
    The [1] of almost similar behavior analysis shows ( figure 12 references ).
    But were staying in reactor pressure vessel for some fuel, nuclear
    Became result of reactor pressure vessel is damaged. Initial pouring water volume [1] less than the setting
    Constant results in a reactor core damage to progress further and ( Figure 13 references ).
    3. 3 Estimation of reactor No. 2 machine
    Inferred from the behavior of temperature measured nuclear States, including comprehensive nuclear State:
    Of to the estimate.


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  • [1] In fuel and melt Eva-2 reactor core analysis, part of the molten pool
    Stays in the reactor core of what exists and sucks the reactor pressure vessel damage
    Became the analysis results. [2] In the analysis, some fuel, reactor
    But became the reactor pressure vessel is to corrupt the solution and results in a pressure vessel to stay
    Became a result of segregation.
    On the other hand, according to the plant parameters, approximately 100 ° c temperature of the reactor pressure vessel bottom~
    attachment 1-18


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  • Remained at approximately 120 ° c, and respond to multiple measurement points just like pouring water amount of fluctuations in
    Is a relatively high temperature of the reactor pressure vessel at the top, you have to heat the reactor pressure vessel.
    Most of the fuel is cooled in reactor pressure vessel that is estimated in the
    Are thought to have ( Figure 14 reference ).
    But, according to the analysis and plant parameters reactor damaged significantly
    Loaded place, move, fall below ( bottom plenum ) most of the Group
    What is ready for stable cooling in near-thought. C-attachment 1-18

    Attachment 1-19

    10
    3/11
    12:00
    3/12
    0:00
    3/12
    12:00
    3/13
    0:00
    3/13
    12:00
    3/14
    0:00
    3/14
    12:00
    3/15
    0:00
    3/15
    12:00
    3/16
    0:00
    3/16
    12:00
    3/17
    0:00
    3/17
    12:00
    3/18
    0:00
    3/18
    12:00
    On
    Nuclear reactor water level (m)
    Shrouded in water (analysis of )
    ダウンカマ water (analysis)
    Actual measurements ( fuel area A)
    RCIC launch
    RCIC stop
    SRV-
    Seawater pouring water start
    TAF
    BAF
    TAF reached (approximately 75 hours after)
    BAF reached (approximately 76 hours later)
    Figure 6 No. 2 aircraft reactor water level change [1]
    -2
    0
    2
    4
    6
    8
    10
    3/11
    12:00
    3/12
    0:00
    3/12
    12:00
    3/13
    0:00
    3/13
    12:00
    3/14
    0:00
    3/14
    12:00
    3/15
    0:00
    3/15
    12:00
    3/16
    0:00
    3/16
    12:00
    3/17
    0:00
    3/17
    12:00
    3/18
    0:00
    3/18
    12:00
    On
    Reactor pressure MPa ([abs])
    RPV pressure (analysis of )
    Actual measurement values
    RCIC start and stop RCIC
    SRV-
    Total instrumentation battery depletion
    The hunting of
    Figure 7 No. 2 aircraft reactor pressure vessel pressure [1]
    Attachment 1-20


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  • 1
    3/11
    12:00
    3/12
    0:00
    3/12
    12:00
    3/13
    0:00
    3/13
    12:00
    3/14
    0:00
    3/14
    12:00
    3/15
    0:00
    3/15
    12:00
    3/16
    0:00
    3/16
    12:00
    3/17
    0:00
    3/17
    12:00
    3/18
    0:00
    3/18
    12:00
    On
    Reactor storage vessel pressure MPa ([abs])
    D/W pressure (analysis of )
    S/C pressure (analysis)
    Actual measurements (D/W)
    Actual measurements (S/C)
    Assuming the leakage D/W
    (Approximately 21 hours after )
    SRV-
    Assuming leakage noise sound :S/C near the S/C (approximately 87 hours later)
    Figure 8 No. 2 aircraft reactor storage vessel pressure [1]

    attachment 1-21


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  • Fuel
    Fee
    Department
    -Scrum after 87 minutes



    Fuel
    Fee
    Department
    -Scrum after approximately 96 hours



    Fuel
    Fee
    Department
    -Scrum after approximately 120 hours



    Fuel
    Fee
    Department
    Is approximately one week after the Scrum

    Damage model
    : Fuel without ( collapse )
    : Normal fuel
    : Damaged fuel deposits to maintain the shape of the fuel rods
    : Fuel melting and flowing coated tube surface fuel rod table
    Hardening cooling in terms of increasing the fuel rod diameter
    : Fuel rod diameter increases further, duct blockage by fuel
    : Formation of molten pool

    Figure 9 diagram no. 2 machine core [1]
    Attachment 1-22


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  • 10
    3/11
    12:00
    3/12
    0:00
    3/12
    12:00
    3/13
    0:00
    3/13
    12:00
    3/14
    0:00
    3/14
    12:00
    3/15
    0:00
    3/15
    12:00
    3/16
    0:00
    3/16
    12:00
    3/17
    0:00
    3/17
    12:00
    3/18
    0:00
    3/18
    12:00
    On
    Reactor water level (m)
    Shrouded in water (analysis of )
    ダウンカマ water (analysis)
    Actual measurements ( fuel area A)
    RCIC launch
    RCIC stop
    SRV-
    Seawater pouring water start
    TAF
    BAF
    TAF reached (approximately 75 hours after)
    BAF reached (approximately 76 hours later)
    Figure 10 No. 2 aircraft reactor water level change [2]
    -2
    0
    2
    4
    6
    8
    10
    3/11
    12:00
    3/12
    0:00
    3/12
    12:00
    3/13
    0:00
    3/13
    12:00
    3/14
    0:00
    3/14
    12:00
    3/15
    0:00
    3/15
    12:00
    3/16
    0:00
    3/16
    12:00
    3/17

    10
    3/11
    12:00
    3/12
    0:00
    3/12
    12:00
    3/13
    0:00
    3/13
    12:00
    3/14
    0:00
    3/14
    12:00
    3/15
    0:00
    3/15
    12:00
    3/16
    0:00
    3/16
    12:00
    3/17
    0:00
    3/17
    12:00
    3/18
    0:00
    3/18
    12:00
    On
    Reactor pressure MPa ([abs])
    RPV pressure (analysis of )
    Actual measurement values
    RCIC start and stop RCIC
    SRV-
    Total instrumentation battery depletion
    The hunting of
    Relocation to the bottom of the plenum (analysis)
    RPV corruption (after approximately 109 hours)
    Figure 11 no. 2 aircraft reactor pressure vessel pressure [2]

    attachment 1-23


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  • 1
    3/11
    12:00
    3/12
    0:00
    3/12
    12:00
    3/13
    0:00
    3/13
    12:00
    3/14
    0:00
    3/14
    12:00
    3/15
    0:00
    3/15
    12:00
    3/16
    0:00
    3/16
    12:00
    3/17
    0:00
    3/17
    12:00
    3/18
    0:00
    3/18
    12:00
    On
    Reactor storage vessel pressure MPa ([abs])
    D/W pressure (analysis of )
    S/C pressure (analysis)
    Actual measurements (D/W)
    Actual measurements (S/C)
    Assuming the leakage D/W
    (Approximately 21 hours after )
    SRV-
    Assuming leakage noise sound :S/C near the S/C (approximately 87 hours later)
    Figure 12 No. 2 aircraft reactor storage vessel pressure [2]

    attachment 1-24


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  • Fuel
    Fee
    Department
    -Scrum after 87 minutes



    Fuel
    Fee
    Department
    -Scrum after approximately 96 hours



    Fuel
    Fee
    Department
    -Scrum after about 100 hours



    Fuel
    Fee
    Department
    After the Scrum is about 109 hours

    Damage model
    : Fuel without ( collapse )
    : Normal fuel
    : Damaged fuel deposits to maintain the shape of the fuel rods
    : Fuel melting and flowing coated tube surface fuel rod table
    Hardening cooling in terms of increasing the fuel rod diameter
    : Fuel rod diameter increases further, duct blockage by fuel
    : Formation of molten pool

    Figure 13 phase diagram of reactor No. 2 machine [2]

    Attachment 1-25


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  • [Important notice]
    For each instrument, earthquake and influenced subsequent events progress, are beyond normal usage conditions.
    The well instrument could not properly measured, there. The situation of the plant
    Because it uses information obtained from multiple instruments, considering also the uncertainty of such instruments, weird
    Making of also focusing on the trends and determine overall.

    Water nozzle N-4B temperature
    Missed the safety valve leakage detector
    RV-2-71 A
    Main steam isolation valve leakage detector
    2-86 A
    On the pressure vessel support skirt
    Temperature
    Pressure vessel ドレンパイプ on
    Temperature
    D/W HVH return temperature (HVH-
    16 A)
    Nuclear reactor control room temperature
    Pressure vessel bottom temperature
    CRD housing top temperature
    ※ Bad solid frame meter
    S/C pool water temperature A
    B S/C pool water temperature
    Figure 14 No. 2 machine representative point temperature (announced as of May)

    4. Fukushima first nuclear power plant No.3 unit
    4.1 MAAP analysis analysis conditions
    Core analysis terms, table 8 plant conditions, table 9, view events events
    To do.
    Analysis made the following two cases.
    (1) Analysis of cases
    Freshwater Flooder for no. 3, table 9, as described in the from 3/13 9:25
    Started the carried out analysis of 2 cases of the following after pouring water amount.
    [Part 1]: an analysis of solving entire reactor water level to the actual measurements (intermediate extent of reactor core)
    To fit the measured at the discharge side of the fire pump pouring water flow than small
    To assume that licked.
    [2]: Water water meter is accurate, that turned out to be no. 1 water meter calibration
    Not shown, not to maintain reactor water reactor Division
    Solving like water, maintaining core of less analysis as
    Pouring water quantity of less than pouring water flow was measured at the discharge side of the fire pumps
    To assume.


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  • ^
    Table 8 No.3 machine plant conditions
    Item condition
    Early reactors 2381 MWt (rating output) output
    7.3 The initial reactor pressure MPa abs (normal operating pressure)
    Early reactors water normal level
    RPV node split reference figure 6
    Enable core node split number 5 node radial:
    Axis 10-node:
    Coated pipe damage to 1000 K temperature
    Core node 2500 K melting point
    Store container model reference material Figure 7
    Store the container space volume D/W 4240 m 3 space:
    S/C space: 3160 m 3
    サプレッション tourbograph 2980 m 3 water
    Decay heat ANSI/ANS5.1-1979 model
    (Assuming the end of equilibrium reactor burnup)

    Attachment 1-27


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  • Table 9 No.3 machine events events
    Legend 1: records and decrease: based on the record estimated □: organize as the assumptions on the analysis of
    Analysis criteria
    No on analysis events
    Category notes
    If Yes: refers to the records, etc.
    Decrease the []‘s if: basis assuming the estimated
    1 / 3 11 14:46 Earthquake-occurring-
    2 14:47 Reactor Scrum-5 16, report 4 driving diary of duty long land revaluation journal
    3 15:06 RCIC manual-start 5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline
    4 15:25 ( L-8 ) RCIC trip-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline
    5 15:38 All AC power loss • 5 / 16 report 4 driving diary of duty long land revaluation journal
    6 16:03 RCIC manual-start 5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline
    7 3 12 11:36 RCIC trip-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline
    8 12:35 HPCI launch ( l )-2-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline
    9 3 13 2:42 HPCI-stop 5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline
    10 9:08
    Around
    Reactor pressure vessels decreased by escape safety valve
    Pneumatic operation

    5 / 16 Report 7 various operations proven streamline
    11, Pressurized storage containers for storing tank vent, 9:20
    -Low-power verification-
    5 / 16 Report 7 various operations proven streamline, 8:41 pressure control room side of AO valve operation
    By bent line configuration has the containment pressure drops
    Bent started assuming 9:20 confirmed
    12 9:25 Fresh water injection start-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline ※ 1
    13-Driven air for storage tank vent, 11:17
    Pressure through the bend line AO valve closed / according to
    Visibility

    5 / 16 Report 7 various operations proven streamline

    Attachment 1-28


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  • 14 12:30 Storage bin vent about the opening operation-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline
    15 13:12 Fresh water injection than seawater injection switching-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline ※ 1
    16-Vent valve closed for storage tank vent, 14:10
    Assuming income
    D/W pressure rise 3 / 13 12:30 starting vent end tentative at this time
    Constant. Furthermore, 5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline, 3 / 15, 16:00 is closed
    That described in
    17 3 / 14 1:10 Pour water into a water pit water supply for stop-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline
    18 3:20 Into a water pit water supply complete, start pouring water-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline ※ 1
    19-Room pressure control for storage tank vent, 5:20
    Side of AO valve operation

    5 / 16 Report 7 various operations proven streamline
    20-Room pressure control for storage tank vent, 12:00
    Suppose a side valve closed NET
    D/W pressure rise 3 / 14 5:20 starting vent end tentative at this time
    Constant. Furthermore, 5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline, 3 / 15, 16:00 is closed
    That described in
    21-Room pressure control for storage tank vent, 16:00
    Assuming the side valve opening


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  • ^
    Assuming the time vent from the D/W pressure falling
    22-Room pressure control for storage tank vent, 21:04
    Suppose a side valve closure

    Assuming the bent end of time D/W pressure rise
    23 3 / 15-Room pressure control for storage tank vent, 16:05
    Side valve opening operation

    5 / 16 Report 7 various operations proven streamline
    24 3 / 16-Room pressure control for storage tank vent, 1:55
    Side valve opening operation income
    5 / 16 Is reported 7 various operations proven streamline said of conducted time to vent
    That is listed, no pressure of D/W from Ben
    G. the assumption and not enforced
    25 3 / 17-Room pressure control for storage tank vent, 21:00
    Check the side valve closed

    5 / 16 Report 7 various operations proven streamline, 3 15 16:05 vent valves open operation
    A closed-check against have been made, although not constrictor D/W pressure changes

    Attachment 1-29


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  • Assuming stuff
    26-Room pressure control for storage tank vent, 21:30
    Side valve opening operation

    5 / 16 Report 7 various operations proven streamline, though opening operations in
    D/W pressure changes-assumptions and what not
    27 3 / 18-Room pressure control for storage tank vent, 5:30
    Check the side valve closed

    5 / 16 Shall vent mentioned though the report’s period of analysis for this analysis
    While outside
    28 5:30
    Around
    -Pressure control room for storage tank vent,
    Side valve opening operation

    5 / 16 Shall vent mentioned though the report’s period of analysis for this analysis
    While outside
    29 3 / 19, Room pressure control for storage tank vent, 11:30
    Check the side valve closed

    5 / 16 Shall vent mentioned though the report’s period of analysis for this analysis
    While outside
    30 3/20 11:25
    Around
    -Pressure control room for storage tank vent,
    Side valve opening operation

    5 / 16 Shall vent mentioned though the report’s period of analysis for this analysis
    While outside
    ※ 1 Pouring water flow and timing of the pouring water flow changes to about 7 different operations proven streamline ( 5 / 16 report ) of based on how much pouring water to date each furnace, daily average flow rate
    And do not exceed the amount of pouring water.

    Attachment 1-30


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  • 4.2 MAAP analysis analysis results
    4.2.1 Analysis case [1] the analysis results
    Table 10 shows the results of the analysis of cases [1].
    Table 10 Summary of no.3 machine analysis results [1]
    Item results
    Nuclear exposure start time after an earthquake is about 40 hours
    Reactor core damage started hours after an earthquake at about 42 hours
    Reactor pressure vessel damage time

    (Unsuccessful in this analysis to damage to nuclear reactor pressure vessel)
    About analysis results [1] described below.
    After stopping the HPCI reactor water level is gradually decreased, reactor, and exposed SRV
    Release is the core and became completely exposed, to start the reactor core damage ( Figure 15 reference ).
    Flooder is commensurate with the reactor water starting this analysis in measurement values
    Pouring water amount and assume doing analysis, not pouring water amount is enough,
    Be maintained around the core area is half submerged. Because of this reactor core damage.
    And when it comes.
    Reactor pressure is between HPCI and RCIC stop SRV hydraulic pressure near at high
    Maintained the pressure. Nuclear reactors and pressure rapidly HPCI stop after SRV release due
    Up to near atmospheric pressure decline ( Figure 16 references ).
    Storage tank pressure is to release to the S/C furnace familial steam pressure S/C and D/W
    Continue to rise. Is also pressure to increase temporarily by the opening of the SRV, S/C
    Pressure to reduce bent. In the subsequent pressure is bent accordingly increase
    Repeated acceleration and reduced ( figure 17 reference ).


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  • ^
    Storage tank pressure is to release to the S/C furnace familial steam pressure S/C and D/W
    Continue to rise. Is also pressure to increase temporarily by the opening of the SRV, S/C
    Pressure to reduce bent. In the subsequent pressure is bent accordingly increase
    Repeated acceleration and reduced ( figure 17 reference ).
    Molten pool reactor part of the State, exist, but the reactor core and Mari, Hara
    That sucks the child reactor pressure vessel damage resulting. This initial RCIC and HPCI.
    HPCI stop pouring water that was done relatively continuously from time pouring water start
    Short compared to the aircraft, and include why ( Figure 18 references ).
    Furthermore, pressure decline is seen HPCI is running in the period. Spur
    Mo’s RPV pressure and D/W pressure changes as a condition of 5/23 report analysis
    Provisional and steam leak D/W outside HPCI steam pipe through 擬する approach
    Constant made analysis of the survey report and beyond and far advanced evaluation, formal HPCI
    HPCI rooms including R/B at high temperature and steam was leaking through the steam piping.
    But the thought can go higher steam atmosphere impossible 3/13

    attachment 1-31

    Translation
    擬する
    Dictionary
    1. 〈つきつける〉 point [level, aim] 《a pistol》 at.
    2. 〈例に定める〉 put 《 somebody 》 down as a candidate 《for》
    3. 〈まねる〉 imitate; copy from; 〈なぞらえる〉 compare 《 something to something 》.


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  • After stopping the HPCI showing driving member enters the room the HPCI, seismic performance evaluation
    From the possible result HPCI steam piping is damaged in the earthquake of the HPCI
    Thought and リークパス had been formed to strains. RPV pressure changes in the
    Due to the steam was consumed continuously HPCI was a continuous operation that
    It is thought.
    4.2.2 Analysis case [2] analysis results
    The following shows analysis results [2] table 11.
    Table 11 Summary of no.3 machine analysis results [2]
    Item results
    Nuclear exposure start time after an earthquake is about 40 hours
    Reactor core damage started hours after an earthquake at about 42 hours
    Reactor pressure vessel damage hours after an earthquake, approximately 66 hours
    About analysis results [2] described below.
    HPCI stopped gradually decreased since, reactor water level changes, reactor, and exposure
    Core and completely exposed SRV opening, to start the reactor core damage ( Figure 19
    See ).


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  • ^
    Flooder amount assumed Flooder is initiated, but not enough to enable fuel
    Bottom of the stick, does more damage to reactor core [1] than resulting progress.
    Reactor pressure reactor migrating lower plenum pressure since, when using SRV DEP.
    Raw temporary pressure increase seen by steam that, about the behavior of the other
    [1] The show nearly as well as trend analysis results and ( Figure 20 reference ).
    Reactor storage tank pressure during nuclear reactor pressure, as well as migrating bottom plenum
    About the behavior of other temporary pressure increase seen by steam to occur,
    [1] The show nearly as well as trend analysis results and ( figure 21 reference ).
    But were staying in reactor pressure vessel for some fuel, nuclear
    Became result of reactor pressure vessel is damaged. Initial Flooder amount [1] less than for the
    Resulted in damage to the reactor core to progress further ( figure 22 references ).
    4. 3 Estimation of reactor No. 3 aircraft
    Inferred from the behavior of temperature measured nuclear State, including overall status of the reactor core
    The estimate.
    [1] In the fuel in the analysis of the melt Eva-3 reactor is part of molten pool is

    attachment 1-32


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  • Stays in the reactor core, they exist, but enough to damage the reactor pressure vessel
    The analysis result. [2] In the analysis, some fuel, nuclear
    And reactor pressure vessel damage but became the results remain within the reactor pressure vessel and the
    Became the analysis results.
    On the other hand, according to the plant parameters, reactor pressure vessel steel approximately 100 ° c temperature-
    Remained at about 200 ° c, and respond to multiple measurement points just like pouring water amount of fluctuations in
    You entered may indicate points of temperature rise, that heat is atomic
    Approximately 100 ° c temperature is estimated to have the reactor pressure vessel, reactor pressure vessel bottom-
    About 170 ° c and remained at the same level and temperature of the reactor pressure vessel around the other?
    The thought and most of the fuel is cooled nuclear reactor pressure vessel ( figure 23 3
    T. ).
    But, according to the analysis and plant parameters reactor damaged significantly
    Loaded place, move, fall below ( bottom plenum ) most of the Group
    What is ready for stable cooling in near-thought.

    Attachment 1-33


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  • RCIC stop
    SRV1 valve open
    Switch to the pouring sea water than fresh water injection
    Seawater pouring water stop
    Flooder water resumption
    HPCI stop
    Fresh water injection start
    HPCI launch
    TAF reached (approximately 40 hours later)
    BAF reached (approximately 42 hours after)

    Shrouded in water (analysis of )
    ダウンカマ water (analysis)
    Actual measurement values

    Reactor water level (m)

    On

    Figure 15 No. 3 aircraft reactor water level change [1]

    HPCI and RCIC stop
    SRV1 valve open
    HPCI KIA

    RPV pressure (analysis of )
    Actual measurement values
    Reactor pressure MPa ([abs])

    On
    Figure 16 no. 3 aircraft reactor pressure vessel pressure [1]

    Attachment 1-34


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  • Heart of the Rose Heart of the Rose

    So ..we are saying ..corium these days….’bout f***ing time.


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  • SRV1 valve open
    S/C vent
    S/C vent
    S/C vent
    S/C vent
    S/C vent
    (Assumption)

    D/W pressure (analysis of )
    S/C pressure (analysis)
    Actual measurements (D/W)
    Actual measurements (S/C)

    Total instrumentation / DS
    Hunting

    Reactor storage vessel pressure MPa ([abs])

    On
    Figure 17 No. 3 aircraft reactor storage vessel pressure [1]

    Attachment 1-35



    Fuel
    Fee
    Department
    -Scrum after 64 minutes



    Fuel
    Fee
    Department
    -Scrum after 68 minutes



    Fuel
    Fee
    Department
    At approximately 72 hours after the Scrum



    Fuel
    Fee
    Department
    Is approximately one week after the Scrum

    Damage model
    : Fuel without ( collapse )
    : Normal fuel
    : Damaged fuel deposits to maintain the shape of the fuel rods
    : Fuel melting and flowing coated tube surface fuel rod table
    Hardening cooling in terms of increasing the fuel rod diameter
    : Fuel rod diameter increases further, duct blockage by fuel
    : Formation of molten pool

    Figure 18 phase diagram of reactor No. 3 aircraft [1]

    attachment 1-36


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  • Start HPCI and RCIC stop PCI stop
    TAF reached (approximately 40 hours later)
    SRV1 valve open
    BAF reached (approximately 42 hours after)
    Seawater pouring water stop
    Flooder water resumption
    Switch to the pouring sea water than fresh water injection
    Fresh water injection start
    ^ blues

    Shrouded in water (analysis of )
    ダウンカマ water (analysis)
    Actual measurement values

    ※ :RPV damage after water (value analysis)
    Mean that keep the water
    It has been.

    Reactor water level (m)

    On

    Figure 19 No. 3 aircraft reactor water level change [2]

    HPCI stop
    RCIC stop
    SRV1 valve open
    HPCI launch
    Relocation to the bottom of the plenum (analysis)
    RPV damage (approximately 66 hours after)
    ^ blues
    RPV pressure (analysis of )
    Actual measurement values

    Reactor pressure MPa ([abs])

    On

    Figure 20 No. 3 aircraft reactor pressure vessel pressure [2]

    Attachment 1-37


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  • James Tekton James Tekton

    Wowie kapowie bro!

    That has to be the record for longest multi-post ever on enenews. Congratulations, you win!

    So glad we have you to keep blazing a trail…been at yer side riding the fence since the beginning and so far…we ain’t goin anywhere yet.

    God bless the Watchmen/women on the wall…all of us!


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  • This is not all of, about half, you will need to compare with original for photos and graphs translations are from, I cab do any later notes if you need then translated, just let me know !


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  • dear jones

    @xdrfox

    Thank you very much.


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