Published: December 1st, 2011 at 12:14 am ET
|
Source: handouts_111130_09-j.pdf (application/pdf Object)
Date: Nov. 30, 2011
Containment Modeling, Page 1-46, 1-47 (85, 86 of 207)

Pg. 85: Concrete Attack by Corium

Pg. 86: Time to Rupture
Published: December 1st, 2011 at 12:14 am ET
|


sending...
3. Fukushima first nuclear power plant No.2
3.1 MAAP analysis analysis conditions
Conditions a major analysis of table 4 plant conditions, table 5-display event event
To do.
Analysis of the following two cases, is also about the leak from the vessel.
Keep under the assumption that analysis.
(1) Analysis of cases
3/14 19:54-Sea note, as stated in table 5 for no. 2,
Water has started, after pouring water amount and conduct analysis of 2 cases:
Hoops.
[Part 1]: an analysis of solving entire reactor water level to the actual measurements (intermediate extent of reactor core)
To fit the measured at the discharge side of the fire pump pouring water flow than small
To assume that licked.
[2]: Water water meter is accurate, that turned out to be no. 1 water meter calibration
Not shown, not to maintain reactor water reactor Division
Solving like water, maintaining core of less analysis as
Pouring water quantity of less than pouring water flow was measured at the discharge side of the fire pumps
To assume.
(2) Vapor from the containment leakage assume full
Value of storage vessel pressure measured in real analysis, had put together some
Second, approximately 21 hours after the earthquake-leakage from the transition zone in containment ( D/W ) care ( about
10 Cm ø ) assumed. Also, as well as the pressure control room of 3 / 15 (hereinafter referred to as “S/C”)
-Leakage from the transition zone in containment ( S/C ) of noise near the boundary ( approx. 10 mm
cm ) assumed.
However, only an assumption of the analysis on the leakage was from a containment is actually
The analysis and measurement values by problems on the Keiki or inconsistent at the moment unclear
There.
Attachment 1-13
Report Comment
Table 4 No. 2 machine plant conditions
Item condition
Early reactors 2381 MWt (rating output) output
7.3 The initial reactor pressure MPa abs (normal operating pressure)
Early reactors water normal level
RPV node split reference figure 6
Enable core node split number 5 node radial:
Axis 10-node:
Coated pipe damage to 1000 K temperature
Core node 2500 K melting point
Store container model reference material Figure 7
Store the container space volume D/W 4240 m 3 space:
S/C space: 3160 m 3
サプレッション tourbograph 2980 m 3 water
Decay heat ANSI/ANS5.1-1979 model
(Assuming the end of equilibrium reactor burnup)
Report Comment
Attachment 1-14
Report Comment
Table 5 No. 2 machine events events
Legend 1: records and decrease: based on the record estimated □: analysis on hypothetical
Analysis criteria
No on analysis events
Category notes
If Yes: where to record
Decrease the []‘s if: basis assuming the estimated
1 / 3 11 14:46 Earthquake-occurring-
2 14:47 Reactor Scrum-5 16, report 4 driving diary of duty long land revaluation journal
3 15:02 RCIC manual-start 5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline
4 15:28 ( L-8 ) RCIC trip-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline
5 15:41 All AC power loss • 5 / 16 report 4 driving diary of duty long land revaluation journal
6 3/12 4:20
~
5:00
Decrypt-RCIC water pressure water tank
The switching-control room
5 / 16 Report 7 various operations proven streamline
7 3 14 13:25 RCIC stop-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline
8 16:34 Nuclear reactor pressure vessel pressure ( SRV1 valve opening ) operation
Start
○
5 / 16 Report 7 various operations proven streamline
Seawater injection work-line of fire extinguishing systems using 16:34
Open
○
5 / 16 Report 7 various operations proven streamline ※ 1
9 18:00
Around
Reactor pressure decline confirmation
○
5 / 16 Report 7 various operations proven streamline
10 Fire pump is out of fuel 19:20 stop-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline ※ 1
11 19:54 Fire pump starts-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline ※ 1 2
19:57 Fire pump second boot-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline ※ 1
Attachment 1-15
Report Comment
12 21: 20 By SRV2 valve opening pressure, water reactor
To recover
○
5 / 16 Report 7 various operations proven streamline ※ 1
13 23:00
Around
Assuming the SRV1 valve closed
□
23 That SRV1 valve closed at the time from the rise of nuclear reactor pressure
Assumptions.
14 3/15 6:14
Around
And noise cause pressure near the control room
Also on the reduce pressure in the room
○
Tokyo electric power HP(http://www.tepco.co.jp/index-j.html ) of press
※ 1 Seawater pouring water start date information 3 / 14 stop fire pump with a 19:20 record from Aru, 3 / 14 16:34 pouring some water made available
In the resolution of water rise in the then confirmed analysis on 3 / 14 assume first seawater pouring water start pouring water from the 19:54.
2 Pouring water flow and timing of the pouring water flow changes to about 7 different operations proven streamline ( 5 / 16 report ) of based on how much pouring water to date each furnace, daily average flow rate
And do not exceed the amount of pouring water.
Attachment 1-16
Report Comment
3.2 MAAP analysis analysis results
3.2.1 Analysis case [1] the analysis results
Results of the analysis of cases [1] as shown in table 6.
Table 6 Summary of no. 2 machine analysis results [1]
Item analysis
Approximately 75 hours, reactor exposure start time occurs after earthquake
Reactor core damage started hours after an earthquake at about 77 hours
Reactor pressure vessel damage time
-
(Unsuccessful in this analysis to damage to nuclear reactor pressure vessel)
About analysis results [1] described below.
After stopping the RCIC reactor water level is gradually decreased, reactor, and exposed SRV
Reactor will be completely exposed by opening the reactor core damage starts ( figure 6 reference ).
Almost at the same time start pouring water showed measurements in analysis of reactor water
Place from doing analysis and pouring water amount commensurate with the assumption, pouring water amount
Well, not, be maintained around the core area is half submerged. For this reason, furnace
Mind would be damaged.
Reactor pressure, while for stopping the RCIC SRV hydraulic pressure near at high pressure state
To be maintained. Nuclear reactor and reduced rapidly by SRV opening of RCIC stop after the
After that down to atmospheric pressure.
Reactor pressure measurements had less analysis than RCIC operation period.
And, リークパス to S/C may was formed through the SRV, net
When the leak was, instrument problems is unknown at this time. Open since the SRV
The behavior and are agreed and analytical measurement value ( Figure 7 references ).
Report Comment
Rise in reactor storage tank pressure is due to the rise in the surface temperature サプレッション tourbograph, Atom
Assume the leak from the reactor containment vessel ( D/W ), similar to measurements and earthquake
D/W pressure rise from occurring and dull. Then, one by the opening of the 3 / 14 SRV
Rise in pressure over time, storing vessel pressure then changes tend to decrease in measurements.
And when it comes. Boundary noise in the analysis of observed near the S/C 3 / 15, S/C care
Leakage occurs in the transition zone to assume conducted analysis ( Figure 8 reference ).
Is part of the reactor No. 2 machine stays in the reactor core of molten pool exist, nuclear
Was enough of the reactor pressure vessel damage results. This is a note early RCIC
1-Time Flooder RCIC stop, that the water was relatively continuously
Report Comment
Short compared to the aircraft, and include why ( Figure 9 reference ). Attachment 1-17
Report Comment
3.2.2 Analysis case [2] analysis results
Table 7 shows the results of the analysis of cases [2].
Table 7 summary of no. 2 machine analysis results [2]
Item analysis
Approximately 75 hours, reactor exposure start time occurs after earthquake
Reactor core damage started hours after an earthquake at about 77 hours
Reactor pressure vessel damage hours after an earthquake at about 109 hours
About analysis results [2] described below.
RCIC stopped after the reactor water level decreased gradually, reactor, and exposure to SRV release
More core and became completely exposed, to start the reactor core damage. Almost at the same time note
Amount of pouring water but water starts, assuming is not enough to enable fuel rod bottom more than
The exasperating ( figure 10 reference ).
Reactor pressure reactor migrating lower plenum pressure since, when using SRV DEP.
Students about the behavior of other found temporary pressure due to steam to increase
[1] The show nearly as well as behavior analysis and ( Figure 11 reference ).
Reactor storage tank pressure during nuclear reactor pressure, as well as migrating bottom plenum
Temporary pressure due to steam to increase seen in the behavior of other recently
The [1] of almost similar behavior analysis shows ( figure 12 references ).
But were staying in reactor pressure vessel for some fuel, nuclear
Became result of reactor pressure vessel is damaged. Initial pouring water volume [1] less than the setting
Constant results in a reactor core damage to progress further and ( Figure 13 references ).
3. 3 Estimation of reactor No. 2 machine
Inferred from the behavior of temperature measured nuclear States, including comprehensive nuclear State:
Of to the estimate.
Report Comment
[1] In fuel and melt Eva-2 reactor core analysis, part of the molten pool
Stays in the reactor core of what exists and sucks the reactor pressure vessel damage
Became the analysis results. [2] In the analysis, some fuel, reactor
But became the reactor pressure vessel is to corrupt the solution and results in a pressure vessel to stay
Became a result of segregation.
On the other hand, according to the plant parameters, approximately 100 ° c temperature of the reactor pressure vessel bottom~
attachment 1-18
Report Comment
Remained at approximately 120 ° c, and respond to multiple measurement points just like pouring water amount of fluctuations in
Is a relatively high temperature of the reactor pressure vessel at the top, you have to heat the reactor pressure vessel.
Most of the fuel is cooled in reactor pressure vessel that is estimated in the
Are thought to have ( Figure 14 reference ).
But, according to the analysis and plant parameters reactor damaged significantly
Loaded place, move, fall below ( bottom plenum ) most of the Group
What is ready for stable cooling in near-thought. C-attachment 1-18
Attachment 1-19
10
3/11
12:00
3/12
0:00
3/12
12:00
3/13
0:00
3/13
12:00
3/14
0:00
3/14
12:00
3/15
0:00
3/15
12:00
3/16
0:00
3/16
12:00
3/17
0:00
3/17
12:00
3/18
0:00
3/18
12:00
On
Nuclear reactor water level (m)
Shrouded in water (analysis of )
ダウンカマ water (analysis)
Actual measurements ( fuel area A)
RCIC launch
RCIC stop
SRV-
Seawater pouring water start
TAF
BAF
TAF reached (approximately 75 hours after)
BAF reached (approximately 76 hours later)
Figure 6 No. 2 aircraft reactor water level change [1]
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
3/11
12:00
3/12
0:00
3/12
12:00
3/13
0:00
3/13
12:00
3/14
0:00
3/14
12:00
3/15
0:00
3/15
12:00
3/16
0:00
3/16
12:00
3/17
0:00
3/17
12:00
3/18
0:00
3/18
12:00
On
Reactor pressure MPa ([abs])
RPV pressure (analysis of )
Actual measurement values
RCIC start and stop RCIC
SRV-
Total instrumentation battery depletion
The hunting of
Figure 7 No. 2 aircraft reactor pressure vessel pressure [1]
Attachment 1-20
Report Comment
1
3/11
12:00
3/12
0:00
3/12
12:00
3/13
0:00
3/13
12:00
3/14
0:00
3/14
12:00
3/15
0:00
3/15
12:00
3/16
0:00
3/16
12:00
3/17
0:00
3/17
12:00
3/18
0:00
3/18
12:00
On
Reactor storage vessel pressure MPa ([abs])
D/W pressure (analysis of )
S/C pressure (analysis)
Actual measurements (D/W)
Actual measurements (S/C)
Assuming the leakage D/W
(Approximately 21 hours after )
SRV-
Assuming leakage noise sound :S/C near the S/C (approximately 87 hours later)
Figure 8 No. 2 aircraft reactor storage vessel pressure [1]
attachment 1-21
Report Comment
↑
↓
Fuel
Fee
Department
-Scrum after 87 minutes
↑
↓
Fuel
Fee
Department
-Scrum after approximately 96 hours
↑
↓
Fuel
Fee
Department
-Scrum after approximately 120 hours
↑
↓
Fuel
Fee
Department
Is approximately one week after the Scrum
Damage model
: Fuel without ( collapse )
: Normal fuel
: Damaged fuel deposits to maintain the shape of the fuel rods
: Fuel melting and flowing coated tube surface fuel rod table
Hardening cooling in terms of increasing the fuel rod diameter
: Fuel rod diameter increases further, duct blockage by fuel
: Formation of molten pool
Figure 9 diagram no. 2 machine core [1]
Attachment 1-22
Report Comment
10
3/11
12:00
3/12
0:00
3/12
12:00
3/13
0:00
3/13
12:00
3/14
0:00
3/14
12:00
3/15
0:00
3/15
12:00
3/16
0:00
3/16
12:00
3/17
0:00
3/17
12:00
3/18
0:00
3/18
12:00
On
Reactor water level (m)
Shrouded in water (analysis of )
ダウンカマ water (analysis)
Actual measurements ( fuel area A)
RCIC launch
RCIC stop
SRV-
Seawater pouring water start
TAF
BAF
TAF reached (approximately 75 hours after)
BAF reached (approximately 76 hours later)
Figure 10 No. 2 aircraft reactor water level change [2]
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
3/11
12:00
3/12
0:00
3/12
12:00
3/13
0:00
3/13
12:00
3/14
0:00
3/14
12:00
3/15
0:00
3/15
12:00
3/16
0:00
3/16
12:00
3/17
10
3/11
12:00
3/12
0:00
3/12
12:00
3/13
0:00
3/13
12:00
3/14
0:00
3/14
12:00
3/15
0:00
3/15
12:00
3/16
0:00
3/16
12:00
3/17
0:00
3/17
12:00
3/18
0:00
3/18
12:00
On
Reactor pressure MPa ([abs])
RPV pressure (analysis of )
Actual measurement values
RCIC start and stop RCIC
SRV-
Total instrumentation battery depletion
The hunting of
Relocation to the bottom of the plenum (analysis)
RPV corruption (after approximately 109 hours)
Figure 11 no. 2 aircraft reactor pressure vessel pressure [2]
attachment 1-23
Report Comment
1
3/11
12:00
3/12
0:00
3/12
12:00
3/13
0:00
3/13
12:00
3/14
0:00
3/14
12:00
3/15
0:00
3/15
12:00
3/16
0:00
3/16
12:00
3/17
0:00
3/17
12:00
3/18
0:00
3/18
12:00
On
Reactor storage vessel pressure MPa ([abs])
D/W pressure (analysis of )
S/C pressure (analysis)
Actual measurements (D/W)
Actual measurements (S/C)
Assuming the leakage D/W
(Approximately 21 hours after )
SRV-
Assuming leakage noise sound :S/C near the S/C (approximately 87 hours later)
Figure 12 No. 2 aircraft reactor storage vessel pressure [2]
attachment 1-24
Report Comment
↑
↓
Fuel
Fee
Department
-Scrum after 87 minutes
↑
↓
Fuel
Fee
Department
-Scrum after approximately 96 hours
↑
↓
Fuel
Fee
Department
-Scrum after about 100 hours
↑
↓
Fuel
Fee
Department
After the Scrum is about 109 hours
Damage model
: Fuel without ( collapse )
: Normal fuel
: Damaged fuel deposits to maintain the shape of the fuel rods
: Fuel melting and flowing coated tube surface fuel rod table
Hardening cooling in terms of increasing the fuel rod diameter
: Fuel rod diameter increases further, duct blockage by fuel
: Formation of molten pool
Figure 13 phase diagram of reactor No. 2 machine [2]
Attachment 1-25
Report Comment
[Important notice]
For each instrument, earthquake and influenced subsequent events progress, are beyond normal usage conditions.
The well instrument could not properly measured, there. The situation of the plant
Because it uses information obtained from multiple instruments, considering also the uncertainty of such instruments, weird
Making of also focusing on the trends and determine overall.
Water nozzle N-4B temperature
Missed the safety valve leakage detector
RV-2-71 A
Main steam isolation valve leakage detector
2-86 A
On the pressure vessel support skirt
Temperature
Pressure vessel ドレンパイプ on
Temperature
D/W HVH return temperature (HVH-
16 A)
Nuclear reactor control room temperature
Pressure vessel bottom temperature
CRD housing top temperature
※ Bad solid frame meter
S/C pool water temperature A
B S/C pool water temperature
Figure 14 No. 2 machine representative point temperature (announced as of May)
4. Fukushima first nuclear power plant No.3 unit
4.1 MAAP analysis analysis conditions
Core analysis terms, table 8 plant conditions, table 9, view events events
To do.
Analysis made the following two cases.
(1) Analysis of cases
Freshwater Flooder for no. 3, table 9, as described in the from 3/13 9:25
Started the carried out analysis of 2 cases of the following after pouring water amount.
[Part 1]: an analysis of solving entire reactor water level to the actual measurements (intermediate extent of reactor core)
To fit the measured at the discharge side of the fire pump pouring water flow than small
To assume that licked.
[2]: Water water meter is accurate, that turned out to be no. 1 water meter calibration
Not shown, not to maintain reactor water reactor Division
Solving like water, maintaining core of less analysis as
Pouring water quantity of less than pouring water flow was measured at the discharge side of the fire pumps
To assume.
Report Comment
^
Table 8 No.3 machine plant conditions
Item condition
Early reactors 2381 MWt (rating output) output
7.3 The initial reactor pressure MPa abs (normal operating pressure)
Early reactors water normal level
RPV node split reference figure 6
Enable core node split number 5 node radial:
Axis 10-node:
Coated pipe damage to 1000 K temperature
Core node 2500 K melting point
Store container model reference material Figure 7
Store the container space volume D/W 4240 m 3 space:
S/C space: 3160 m 3
サプレッション tourbograph 2980 m 3 water
Decay heat ANSI/ANS5.1-1979 model
(Assuming the end of equilibrium reactor burnup)
Attachment 1-27
Report Comment
Table 9 No.3 machine events events
Legend 1: records and decrease: based on the record estimated □: organize as the assumptions on the analysis of
Analysis criteria
No on analysis events
Category notes
If Yes: refers to the records, etc.
Decrease the []‘s if: basis assuming the estimated
1 / 3 11 14:46 Earthquake-occurring-
2 14:47 Reactor Scrum-5 16, report 4 driving diary of duty long land revaluation journal
3 15:06 RCIC manual-start 5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline
4 15:25 ( L-8 ) RCIC trip-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline
5 15:38 All AC power loss • 5 / 16 report 4 driving diary of duty long land revaluation journal
6 16:03 RCIC manual-start 5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline
7 3 12 11:36 RCIC trip-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline
8 12:35 HPCI launch ( l )-2-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline
9 3 13 2:42 HPCI-stop 5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline
10 9:08
Around
Reactor pressure vessels decreased by escape safety valve
Pneumatic operation
○
5 / 16 Report 7 various operations proven streamline
11, Pressurized storage containers for storing tank vent, 9:20
-Low-power verification-
5 / 16 Report 7 various operations proven streamline, 8:41 pressure control room side of AO valve operation
By bent line configuration has the containment pressure drops
Bent started assuming 9:20 confirmed
12 9:25 Fresh water injection start-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline ※ 1
13-Driven air for storage tank vent, 11:17
Pressure through the bend line AO valve closed / according to
Visibility
○
5 / 16 Report 7 various operations proven streamline
Attachment 1-28
Report Comment
14 12:30 Storage bin vent about the opening operation-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline
15 13:12 Fresh water injection than seawater injection switching-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline ※ 1
16-Vent valve closed for storage tank vent, 14:10
Assuming income
D/W pressure rise 3 / 13 12:30 starting vent end tentative at this time
Constant. Furthermore, 5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline, 3 / 15, 16:00 is closed
That described in
17 3 / 14 1:10 Pour water into a water pit water supply for stop-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline
18 3:20 Into a water pit water supply complete, start pouring water-5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline ※ 1
19-Room pressure control for storage tank vent, 5:20
Side of AO valve operation
○
5 / 16 Report 7 various operations proven streamline
20-Room pressure control for storage tank vent, 12:00
Suppose a side valve closed NET
D/W pressure rise 3 / 14 5:20 starting vent end tentative at this time
Constant. Furthermore, 5 / 16 report 7 various operations proven streamline, 3 / 15, 16:00 is closed
That described in
21-Room pressure control for storage tank vent, 16:00
Assuming the side valve opening
△
Report Comment
^
Assuming the time vent from the D/W pressure falling
22-Room pressure control for storage tank vent, 21:04
Suppose a side valve closure
△
Assuming the bent end of time D/W pressure rise
23 3 / 15-Room pressure control for storage tank vent, 16:05
Side valve opening operation
○
5 / 16 Report 7 various operations proven streamline
24 3 / 16-Room pressure control for storage tank vent, 1:55
Side valve opening operation income
5 / 16 Is reported 7 various operations proven streamline said of conducted time to vent
That is listed, no pressure of D/W from Ben
G. the assumption and not enforced
25 3 / 17-Room pressure control for storage tank vent, 21:00
Check the side valve closed
△
5 / 16 Report 7 various operations proven streamline, 3 15 16:05 vent valves open operation
A closed-check against have been made, although not constrictor D/W pressure changes
Attachment 1-29
Report Comment
Assuming stuff
26-Room pressure control for storage tank vent, 21:30
Side valve opening operation
△
5 / 16 Report 7 various operations proven streamline, though opening operations in
D/W pressure changes-assumptions and what not
27 3 / 18-Room pressure control for storage tank vent, 5:30
Check the side valve closed
-
5 / 16 Shall vent mentioned though the report’s period of analysis for this analysis
While outside
28 5:30
Around
-Pressure control room for storage tank vent,
Side valve opening operation
-
5 / 16 Shall vent mentioned though the report’s period of analysis for this analysis
While outside
29 3 / 19, Room pressure control for storage tank vent, 11:30
Check the side valve closed
-
5 / 16 Shall vent mentioned though the report’s period of analysis for this analysis
While outside
30 3/20 11:25
Around
-Pressure control room for storage tank vent,
Side valve opening operation
-
5 / 16 Shall vent mentioned though the report’s period of analysis for this analysis
While outside
※ 1 Pouring water flow and timing of the pouring water flow changes to about 7 different operations proven streamline ( 5 / 16 report ) of based on how much pouring water to date each furnace, daily average flow rate
And do not exceed the amount of pouring water.
Attachment 1-30
Report Comment
4.2 MAAP analysis analysis results
4.2.1 Analysis case [1] the analysis results
Table 10 shows the results of the analysis of cases [1].
Table 10 Summary of no.3 machine analysis results [1]
Item results
Nuclear exposure start time after an earthquake is about 40 hours
Reactor core damage started hours after an earthquake at about 42 hours
Reactor pressure vessel damage time
-
(Unsuccessful in this analysis to damage to nuclear reactor pressure vessel)
About analysis results [1] described below.
After stopping the HPCI reactor water level is gradually decreased, reactor, and exposed SRV
Release is the core and became completely exposed, to start the reactor core damage ( Figure 15 reference ).
Flooder is commensurate with the reactor water starting this analysis in measurement values
Pouring water amount and assume doing analysis, not pouring water amount is enough,
Be maintained around the core area is half submerged. Because of this reactor core damage.
And when it comes.
Reactor pressure is between HPCI and RCIC stop SRV hydraulic pressure near at high
Maintained the pressure. Nuclear reactors and pressure rapidly HPCI stop after SRV release due
Up to near atmospheric pressure decline ( Figure 16 references ).
Storage tank pressure is to release to the S/C furnace familial steam pressure S/C and D/W
Continue to rise. Is also pressure to increase temporarily by the opening of the SRV, S/C
Pressure to reduce bent. In the subsequent pressure is bent accordingly increase
Repeated acceleration and reduced ( figure 17 reference ).
Report Comment
^
Storage tank pressure is to release to the S/C furnace familial steam pressure S/C and D/W
Continue to rise. Is also pressure to increase temporarily by the opening of the SRV, S/C
Pressure to reduce bent. In the subsequent pressure is bent accordingly increase
Repeated acceleration and reduced ( figure 17 reference ).
Molten pool reactor part of the State, exist, but the reactor core and Mari, Hara
That sucks the child reactor pressure vessel damage resulting. This initial RCIC and HPCI.
HPCI stop pouring water that was done relatively continuously from time pouring water start
Short compared to the aircraft, and include why ( Figure 18 references ).
Furthermore, pressure decline is seen HPCI is running in the period. Spur
Mo’s RPV pressure and D/W pressure changes as a condition of 5/23 report analysis
Provisional and steam leak D/W outside HPCI steam pipe through 擬する approach
Constant made analysis of the survey report and beyond and far advanced evaluation, formal HPCI
HPCI rooms including R/B at high temperature and steam was leaking through the steam piping.
But the thought can go higher steam atmosphere impossible 3/13
attachment 1-31
Translation
擬する
Dictionary
1. 〈つきつける〉 point [level, aim] 《a pistol》 at.
2. 〈例に定める〉 put 《 somebody 》 down as a candidate 《for》
3. 〈まねる〉 imitate; copy from; 〈なぞらえる〉 compare 《 something to something 》.
Report Comment
After stopping the HPCI showing driving member enters the room the HPCI, seismic performance evaluation
From the possible result HPCI steam piping is damaged in the earthquake of the HPCI
Thought and リークパス had been formed to strains. RPV pressure changes in the
Due to the steam was consumed continuously HPCI was a continuous operation that
It is thought.
4.2.2 Analysis case [2] analysis results
The following shows analysis results [2] table 11.
Table 11 Summary of no.3 machine analysis results [2]
Item results
Nuclear exposure start time after an earthquake is about 40 hours
Reactor core damage started hours after an earthquake at about 42 hours
Reactor pressure vessel damage hours after an earthquake, approximately 66 hours
About analysis results [2] described below.
HPCI stopped gradually decreased since, reactor water level changes, reactor, and exposure
Core and completely exposed SRV opening, to start the reactor core damage ( Figure 19
See ).
Report Comment
^
Flooder amount assumed Flooder is initiated, but not enough to enable fuel
Bottom of the stick, does more damage to reactor core [1] than resulting progress.
Reactor pressure reactor migrating lower plenum pressure since, when using SRV DEP.
Raw temporary pressure increase seen by steam that, about the behavior of the other
[1] The show nearly as well as trend analysis results and ( Figure 20 reference ).
Reactor storage tank pressure during nuclear reactor pressure, as well as migrating bottom plenum
About the behavior of other temporary pressure increase seen by steam to occur,
[1] The show nearly as well as trend analysis results and ( figure 21 reference ).
But were staying in reactor pressure vessel for some fuel, nuclear
Became result of reactor pressure vessel is damaged. Initial Flooder amount [1] less than for the
Resulted in damage to the reactor core to progress further ( figure 22 references ).
4. 3 Estimation of reactor No. 3 aircraft
Inferred from the behavior of temperature measured nuclear State, including overall status of the reactor core
The estimate.
[1] In the fuel in the analysis of the melt Eva-3 reactor is part of molten pool is
attachment 1-32
Report Comment
Stays in the reactor core, they exist, but enough to damage the reactor pressure vessel
The analysis result. [2] In the analysis, some fuel, nuclear
And reactor pressure vessel damage but became the results remain within the reactor pressure vessel and the
Became the analysis results.
On the other hand, according to the plant parameters, reactor pressure vessel steel approximately 100 ° c temperature-
Remained at about 200 ° c, and respond to multiple measurement points just like pouring water amount of fluctuations in
You entered may indicate points of temperature rise, that heat is atomic
Approximately 100 ° c temperature is estimated to have the reactor pressure vessel, reactor pressure vessel bottom-
About 170 ° c and remained at the same level and temperature of the reactor pressure vessel around the other?
The thought and most of the fuel is cooled nuclear reactor pressure vessel ( figure 23 3
T. ).
But, according to the analysis and plant parameters reactor damaged significantly
Loaded place, move, fall below ( bottom plenum ) most of the Group
What is ready for stable cooling in near-thought.
Attachment 1-33
Report Comment
RCIC stop
SRV1 valve open
Switch to the pouring sea water than fresh water injection
Seawater pouring water stop
Flooder water resumption
HPCI stop
Fresh water injection start
HPCI launch
TAF reached (approximately 40 hours later)
BAF reached (approximately 42 hours after)
Shrouded in water (analysis of )
ダウンカマ water (analysis)
Actual measurement values
Reactor water level (m)
On
Figure 15 No. 3 aircraft reactor water level change [1]
HPCI and RCIC stop
SRV1 valve open
HPCI KIA
RPV pressure (analysis of )
Actual measurement values
Reactor pressure MPa ([abs])
On
Figure 16 no. 3 aircraft reactor pressure vessel pressure [1]
Attachment 1-34
Report Comment
So ..we are saying ..corium these days….’bout f***ing time.
Report Comment
SRV1 valve open
S/C vent
S/C vent
S/C vent
S/C vent
S/C vent
(Assumption)
D/W pressure (analysis of )
S/C pressure (analysis)
Actual measurements (D/W)
Actual measurements (S/C)
Total instrumentation / DS
Hunting
Reactor storage vessel pressure MPa ([abs])
On
Figure 17 No. 3 aircraft reactor storage vessel pressure [1]
Attachment 1-35
↑
↓
Fuel
Fee
Department
-Scrum after 64 minutes
↑
↓
Fuel
Fee
Department
-Scrum after 68 minutes
↑
↓
Fuel
Fee
Department
At approximately 72 hours after the Scrum
↑
↓
Fuel
Fee
Department
Is approximately one week after the Scrum
Damage model
: Fuel without ( collapse )
: Normal fuel
: Damaged fuel deposits to maintain the shape of the fuel rods
: Fuel melting and flowing coated tube surface fuel rod table
Hardening cooling in terms of increasing the fuel rod diameter
: Fuel rod diameter increases further, duct blockage by fuel
: Formation of molten pool
Figure 18 phase diagram of reactor No. 3 aircraft [1]
attachment 1-36
Report Comment
Start HPCI and RCIC stop PCI stop
TAF reached (approximately 40 hours later)
SRV1 valve open
BAF reached (approximately 42 hours after)
Seawater pouring water stop
Flooder water resumption
Switch to the pouring sea water than fresh water injection
Fresh water injection start
^ blues
Shrouded in water (analysis of )
ダウンカマ water (analysis)
Actual measurement values
※ :RPV damage after water (value analysis)
Mean that keep the water
It has been.
Reactor water level (m)
On
Figure 19 No. 3 aircraft reactor water level change [2]
HPCI stop
RCIC stop
SRV1 valve open
HPCI launch
Relocation to the bottom of the plenum (analysis)
RPV damage (approximately 66 hours after)
^ blues
RPV pressure (analysis of )
Actual measurement values
Reactor pressure MPa ([abs])
On
Figure 20 No. 3 aircraft reactor pressure vessel pressure [2]
Attachment 1-37
Report Comment
Wowie kapowie bro!
That has to be the record for longest multi-post ever on enenews. Congratulations, you win!
So glad we have you to keep blazing a trail…been at yer side riding the fence since the beginning and so far…we ain’t goin anywhere yet.
God bless the Watchmen/women on the wall…all of us!
Report Comment
This is not all of, about half, you will need to compare with original for photos and graphs translations are from, I cab do any later notes if you need then translated, just let me know !
Report Comment
@xdrfox
Thank you very much.
Report Comment