FORUM: General Nuclear Issues Discussion Thread

Published: October 1st, 2014 at 12:01 am ET
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Previous General Nuclear Issues Discussion Thread here: http://enenews.com/forum-general-nuclear-issues-discussion-thread

Published: October 1st, 2014 at 12:01 am ET
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10,064 comments

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10,064 comments to FORUM: General Nuclear Issues Discussion Thread

  • My School Field Trip Inside Turkey Point Nuclear Plant

  • freebywill

    Peach Bottom (PA) PART 21 – HYDRAULIC SNUBBER SEAL MATERIAL DEVIATION INTERIM REPORT http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160315en.html#en51788

    " During the course of routine refueling outage activities in October 2015, it was discovered that 9 of these 14 snubbers had no hydraulic fluid in the reservoir. The cause of the hydraulic fluid loss was premature aging of the reservoir piston seal due to vibration induced frictional heat. Subsequent laboratory testing of both replacement and degraded seal material by Exelon Power Labs suggested that a material substitution had been made from the Anvil approved Ethylene Propylene (EP) compound to a different grade of EP rubber."

    [ Peach Bottom is the only plant named in the EN but others may be involved. ]

    [ A snubber is basically a hydraulic shock absorber, they are used in NPP's to limit movement of pipes during seismic events and during normal operation to limit movement from vibration or thermal changes. ]

    Pg 3 fig 3 of this document
    http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1473&context=theses
    shows a snubber in use at Diablo Canyon

    [ from the EN it appears the seal manufacturer made a change without proper testing, oops. ]

    [ No problem unless there is an earthquake, but don't worry, before the next earthquake they will have found out how many plants are affected and will have fixed them. ]

  • freebywill

    Fuel Cycle Facility EUNICE,NM; ITEMS RELIED ON FOR SAFETY (IROFS) NOT PERFORMED http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160315en.html#en51776

    " […] March 7, 2016, UUSA [Urenco USA] operators moved drums containing uranic material into an IROFS [Items Relied On For Safety] controlled array. This IROFS requires initial and independent operator verification to ensure a subcritical geometry exists prior to adding any new material to the array. The operators moving the drums did not perform the administrative IROFS; that is,

    neither an initial nor an independent verification were completed prior to adding five additional drums to the array.

    "The drums contain clean up materials contaminated with UF6 at unknown levels of enrichment. [ they got lucky ]

    A nuclear criticality did not occur. The array is in a subcritical geometry. No external events are affecting this event. No emergencies have been, nor will any be declared.

    "No state or other federal agencies will be notified. No press releases are planned.

    [ here is the investigation and corrective action ]

    "Number and types of controls necessary to restore a safe situation:

    A member of operations management passed through during a routine plant tour, questioned the operators, and determined that the drums had been placed in a safe geometry in the array without performing the required IROFS surveillance.

  • freebywill

    US_NPP Point Beach 1 (WI) @ 0 % IDENTIFIED PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160316en.html#en51792

    "During a scheduled refueling outage, an inspection of containment components revealed a suspected through wall leak on 1CV-200B, Letdown Orifice 'B' Outlet Control.

    Non-destructive engineering inspection has been completed and determined that an indication exists.

    "10 CFR 50.2(2)(i) defines the reactor coolant pressure boundary as being connected to the reactor coolant system, up to and including the outermost containment isolation valve in system piping which penetrates primary reactor containment.

    1CV-200B is isolable from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) by a single motor operated valve, 1RC-427, Reactor Coolant Loop 'B' Leg to CVCS Letdown Isolation valve.

    1CV-200B is located inside of containment between 1RC-427 and the two containment isolation valves for the letdown line, 1CV-371 and 1CV-371A.

    Based on the definition provided in 10 CFR 50.2, the condition is considered pressure boundary leakage and is considered reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii).

    Unit 1 is currently in Mode 6. Repairs for the condition are being determined.

    The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

  • freebywill

    The US Just Admitted the 14 Airmen in Charge of 150 Nuclear Missiles — are Coke & Molly Addicts | http://thefreethoughtproject.com/14-airmen-responsible-guarding-u-s-nukes-caught-cocaine/

    Tasked with guarding 150 nuclear missiles at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming, fourteen airmen are under investigation for allegedly using cocaine. Last year, three launch officers, known as missileers, pleaded guilty to using ecstasy after an investigation into illegal drug possession uncovered roughly 100 officers involved in a cheating scandal.

    Marred with a history of misconduct and poor leadership, the U.S. government has admittedly placed unethical coke and molly addicts in charge of guarding and operating the country’s nuclear stockpile. Although President Obama initially campaigned for disarmament, he continues funding and rebuilding nuclear facilities while issuing cheaters and cokeheads to watch over hundreds of active nukes.

    from the movie Fail Safe (2000)
    "What do we say to the dead?" | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sMkiW4kZkfA

    [ appears the full movie has been removed from utoob ]

  • freebywill

    US_NPP Limerick 1 @ 0 % PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160321en.html#en51809

    "During a planned Unit 1 shutdown for a refueling outage, a 0.5 gpm 'pressure boundary leak' was identified on a 1 inch pipe connected to the '1A' RHR-Shutdown Cooling return line by the drywell leak inspection team during a drywell inspection at approximately 15% power. The leak exceeded the TS 3.4.3.2 'Operational Leakage' LCO of no pressure boundary leakage. TS action 'a' was entered which requires to be in at least Hot Shutdown within 12 hours and Cold Shutdown within the next 24 hours. Therefore, the event is reportable within 4 hours per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) due to the initiation of a plant shutdown required by the plant's TS.

    "The event is also reportable within 8 hours per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) due to an event that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded.

    [ interesting report – while going thru normal SD routines prior to refueling a leak was discovered requiring immediate shutdown. This unit started coasting down on Feb 25 ( 25 days coasting ), no info on how long this was leaking ]

  • freebywill

    US_NPP Arkansas 1 @ 100 % UNANALYZED CONDITION THAT COULD CHALLENGE RHR EQUIPMENT DURING FLOOD CONDITIONS http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160321en.html#en51808

    "Two (2) potentially degraded flood barriers at penetrations 0073-01-0034 and 0073-01-0063 were identified in the area between the Unit 1 Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building. The deficient barriers are a 'blockout section' of the floor designed to house multiple penetrations that transition from the Turbine Building to the Auxiliary Building. Attempts have been made to investigate the status of the flood barrier with no definitive results. Investigations and additional evaluations are continuing, however, it is currently unknown if the aggregate of these two flood barriers could potentially overwhelm and flood the Auxiliary Building which would challenge equipment necessary to remove residual heat and constitute an unanalyzed condition.

    "Based on current conditions (i.e., no forecast flooding conditions), this condition does not present an immediate safety concern.

    "[…] This condition is a non-emergency condition. This condition has been entered into the Corrective Action Program.

    "Compensatory measures have been prepared to allow placement of a seal over the identified deficient barriers. If required these seals can be installed well in advance of forecast flood conditions. Permanent repairs are currently being designed for installation."

  • freebywill

    US_NPP Fort Calhoun 1 @ 100 % SHUTDOWN COOLING PIPE VOID http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160321en.html#en51807

    "During a scheduled surveillance test on 3/18/2016 at 1128 [CDT], Fort Calhoun ultrasonic testing technicians discovered a void on the common shutdown cooling heat exchanger discharge piping. This piping is normally isolated during power operation, and the void does not adversely affect the Containment Spray function, Low Pressure Safety Injection function, or High Pressure Safety Injection function.

    "This isolated piping with the void is placed in service only during shutdown cooling operation. The fluid height measured was 10.8 inches, compared to the required height of 11.7 inches for the surveillance test. The void could potentially complicate the initiation of shutdown cooling in the required mode of operation.

    "This piping was last tested satisfactory on 12/31/2015. The source of the void is still under investigation.

    "Fort Calhoun maintenance was successful in venting the void on 3/18/2016 at 1704 CDT."

    [ so this is something they can't detect until shutdown cooling is needed, a void in this instance appears to be an air pocket in the piping, if air is getting in I would think that water is getting out ]

  • freebywill

    US_NPP Byron @ 100 % FITNESS FOR DUTY – CONFIRMED POSITIVE TEST FOR ALCOHOL
    http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160321en.html#en51806

    "In accordance with 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(ii), this notification reports a non-licensed contracted employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended.

    [ interesting thing is that on the day this event occurred ( Fri Mar 18 ) Byron 1 reported 55 % power, Byron 2 is scheduled to begin refueling Apr 18 so the contractor may likely be part of the refueling crew prepping the unit ]

  • freebywill

    US_NPP LaSalle 1 @ 0 % [ shutdown again for unknown reason, this is the 2nd time this unit has shutdown since completing refueling on Mar 8. On Mar 9 L1 posted 1 % power and reached 32 % on Friday only to be shutdown on Saturday and was down for 4 days. On March 16 L1 began to power up again and reached 82 % on Friday but posted 55 % on Saturday and was shutdown soon after posting 0 % on Sunday. No info on whats keeping L1 from being able to return to full power. ]

  • freebywill

    Age-dependent dose to members of the public from intake of radionuclides: Part 5 compilation of ingestion and inhalation dose coefficients
    Ann ICRP January 1996 26: 1-91,

    http://ani.sagepub.com/content/26/1/1.full.pdf

    This item requires a subscription to Annals of the ICRP.

    I can haz pdf ?

  • freebywill

    US_NPP McGuire 1 (NC) @ 0 % OFFSITE MEDICAL TREATMENT REQUIRED http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160322en.html#en51811

    "At 1152 EDT, a contractor employee working in the Containment Building in a potentially contaminated area was found passed out and unresponsive. At 1210 EDT, the individual was transported to Carolinas Medical Center, Charlotte, NC. Radiation Protection had not yet fully determined if the individual was contaminated. At 1300 EDT, Radiation Protection determined the individual was not contaminated. The determination was made after arrival to the hospital.

    "The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

    [ bet the ambulance and hospital staff was relieved to find out the patient wasn't contaminated AFTER they attended to him ]

    [ btw this unit did not show any coast down or walk down, McGuire 1 posted 100 % on Friday Mar 18 and 0 % on Saturday. This medical event happened on the third day of shutdown. Its possible the person suffered a heat exhaustion injury if he was inside the PCV ]

  • freebywill

    US_NPP LaSalle 1 (IL) @ 2 % [ marking its third attempt at restart after refueling, still no info as to what the problem is ]

  • freebywill

    US_NPP McGuire 1 (NC) @ 0 % DEGRADED CONDITION FOUND IN REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PIPING http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160323en.html#en51817

    "On Tuesday, March 22, 2016, while performing planned inspections of Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System piping welds, a flaw indication was identified on a 3 inch Charging Line connection to the Reactor Coolant System piping.

    "NDE [Non-Destructive Evaluation] results showed a change in the flaw since the previous outage inspection and the condition is now determined as not meeting the acceptance criteria specified in ASME Code Section XI. As such, this indication is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) as a degraded condition.

    "An action plan is being developed. There is no impact on current Unit 1 refueling operations. This condition and the action plan have no impact to the health and safety of the public or employees.

    [ the last refueling of McGuire 1 was sep 2014, so this flaw was known and is now severe enough to require repair ]

    [ the " action plan " being developed is code named " Shoot we need to fix this before it blows up " ]

  • freebywill

    US_NPP Watts Bar 1 (TN) @ 0 % WATTS BAR AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160323en.html#en51816

    "On March 22, 2016, at 1131 EDT, the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (WBN1) reactor tripped due to the actuation of the Over Temperature Delta Temperature bistables. Concurrent with the reactor trip, the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system actuated. All control rods inserted upon the reactor trip. Engineered Safety Function systems functioned as expected.

    "WBN1 is currently stable in Mode 3. The Reactor Coolant system is being maintained at normal operating pressure and no-load temperature with decay heat removal via the Main Condenser steam dumps and the AFW system. The station is in a normal shutdown electrical alignment. Watts Bar Unit 2 is in mode 4 preparing for power ascension testing and was unaffected by the WBN1 event.

    "The cause of the event is under investigation. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."

    The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • freebywill

    US_NPP Monticello 1 (MN) @ 100 % HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) OIL LEAK http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160323en.html#en51812

    "On 3/22/2016 during performance of HPCI FLOW CONTROL SYSTEM DYNAMIC TEST PROCEDURE, an oil leak was discovered on the hydraulic control oil piping. HPCI had previously been declared INOPERABLE due to planned maintenance, however as a result of the oil leak HPCI remains INOPERABLE. This oil leak would have cause HPCI to be declared INOPERABLE had it been found outside of the planned maintenance. The plant remains at 100% power with no challenges to the health and safety of the public."

    HPCI is in a 14 day technical specification to repair the oil leak.

  • freebywill

    A look at Riverbends 2016 First Quarter near meltdown.

    In a NuclearHotseat episode Ms Halevy talked about this article by Dr Ian Fairlie
    http://www.theecologist.org/News/news_analysis/2574389/radioactive_spikes_from_nuclear_plants_a_likely_cause_of_childhood_leukemia.html
    concerning the radiation spike associated with refueling.

    From that I began tracking daily operations of US_NPPs to see if it was possible to find a way to determine when this was happening and give advanced warning to people.

    Using info found on nuclear worker sites that show the schedule of when plants are refueling we know when they start the refueling process but not the sequence of events that lead up to the release and resulting spike.

    Using data provided by the NRC I built a spreadsheet to track the daily power reports from plants.

    This page shows an example of the daily power reports organized by NRC region and plant name alphabetically.
    http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/reactor-status/2016/20160325ps.html

    In the spreadsheet, each day is a column of the power figures leading to a running record of power readings.

    This page can be used to recover missed data but as you can see it is in a different format so I had to build a converter to get it into the alpha by region format.
    http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/reactor-status/PowerReactorStatusForLast365Days.txt

    • freebywill

      cont – Riverbends 2016 First Quarter near meltdown.

      I also read and record info from the NRC Event Notification pages.
      http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/

      From reading the event notices I have found info that shows the earliest ( so far )
      that the can (RPV) is opened is five days after the reactor is shutdown.

      By combining information I can track activities at nuke plants, or so I thought.

      Recently while working on this I accidently deleted some data columns and had saved the sheet so I couldn't recover the data
      but had to go back and retrieve the raw data from the NRC. I was on the daily status page and rather that get the data from
      the Last365 page and convert it, I decided to just go grab it from an earlier daily status page.

      Surprise ! It appears that after a 30 day gap, additional info is posted to the daily status page as you can see here.
      http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/reactor-status/2016/20160225ps.html

      At the bottom of the page it shows this: Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 24, 2016

      To verify this I viewed a number of pages and recoded the date of the report and the date of last review

      Report Date ————— Review/Update
      20160218_NRC_Reactor_Status_20160317
      20160217_NRC_Reactor_Status_20160316
      20160216_NRC_Reactor_Status_20160315
      20160215_NRC_Reactor_Status_20160314
      20160214_NRC_Reactor_Status_20160314
      20160213_NRC_Reactor_Status_20160314

      • freebywill

        cont – Riverbends 2016 First Quarter near meltdown.

        But wait what is this ?

        ON 20160225 report River Bend 1 | 0 | 02/17/2016 | FORCED OUTAGE – MAIN CONDENSER IN LEAKAGE

        I didn't remember this event so I checked the ENs for that date.
        ELECTRICAL BREAKER ISSUE IDENTIFIED DURING AN ENGINEERING REVIEW
        http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160225en.html#en51754

        I then went back and read every Status report to Jan 01, 2016 and recorded all info pertaining to River Bend 1
        and was able to reconstruct the event sequence.

        On Jan 05 this happened
        SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DECLARED INOPERABLE http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160107en.html#en51637
        but wasn't reported to the NRC until the next day ( a saturday when the NRC is closed )
        on Sunday Jan 6 this happened
        INVALID ACTUATION OF THE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION LOGIC
        http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160310en.html#en51784
        but wasn't reported to the NRC until March 9th

        On Jan 14 RB1 status was changed to FORCED OUTAGE and on Sunday Jan 17 it was changed to REFUELING OUTAGE
        then on Monday Jan 18 ( MLKs Birthday a Federal Holiday, NRC closed ) they changed it to

        River Bend 1 – >>> REPLACING THREE LEAKING FUEL BUNDLES <<< ? huh

        • freebywill

          cont – Riverbends 2016 First Quarter near meltdown.

          this persisted until Friday Jan 29 when RB1 status changed to FORCED OUTAGE – MAKING PREPARATIONS FOR START UP
          when the following occurred and was reported to the NRC
          SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION AFTER LOSS OF ONE OFFSITE POWER SOURCE
          http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160201en.html#en51701

          over the next days they were powering up when they reported HOLD FOR HEATER DRAIN PUMP MAINTENANCE

          RB1 achieved 100 % power on Monday Feb 09 and ran until Friday Feb 12
          on Saturday power was lowered to 27 % when they reported SWAPPING AIR EJECTORS

          On Feb 16 at 90 % they reported CORE FLOW LIMIT WILL DOWN POWER TODAY FOR ROD PATTERN ADJUSTMENT
          and the next day Feb 17 at 30 % COMMENCING SHUTDOWN DUE TO CONDENSER IN LEAKAGE
          Feb 18 th River Bend 1 at 0 % FORCED OUTAGE – MAIN CONDENSER IN LEAKAGE

          On Feb 24 they issued this Event Notice ( for the public to look at )
          ELECTRICAL BREAKER ISSUE IDENTIFIED DURING AN ENGINEERING REVIEW
          http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160225en.html#en51754
          while still reporting FORCED OUTAGE – MAIN CONDENSER IN LEAKAGE internally to the NRC
          and the same on Feb 26 th.

          From Feb 27th on we can only see the power status since we have to wait a month before data is filled in.

          • freebywill

            cont – Riverbends 2016 First Quarter near meltdown.

            But wait whats this ? The March 01 report has the full data and shows it was last updated Mar 01.
            http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/reactor-status/2016/20160301ps.html

            We shouldn't see the extra data until about April 01.
            Does the NRC actually have the daily status data but are
            with-holding it for a month before public disclosure ?

            River Bend 1 achieved full power on March 08.

            On Mar 09 the following was reported to the NRC ( event on Jan 10 at 2:43 am CST )
            INVALID ACTUATION OF THE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION LOGIC
            http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160310en.html#en51784

            Operators blew a fuse trying to install jumpers to " bypass certain isolation signals for the suction valves
            in the residual heat removal (RHR) system that comprise the shutdown cooling flow path. " which blew a fuse
            " The main control room crew implemented recovery procedures to restore shutdown cooling to service at 0401 CST,
            prior to exceeding any temperature limits. "

            " During this event, the RCS temperature increased from approximately 130 to 190 degree F. "

            "This event resulted from the failure to maintain corrective actions in place that were develop after a similar event in 1994.
            Additionally,
            the operators were not using the type of jumpers required by the procedure, which likely contributed to the blown fuse. "

  • freebywill

    US_NPP Units scheduled to begin refueling this week …

    Davis-Besse 1…(OH)….03/26/16
    Callaway 1……(MO)….03/27/16
    Turkey Point 4..(FL)….03/28/16

  • PlowboyGrownUp

    "Japan utility to scrap reactor over heavy safety costs
    Tokyo (AFP) March 25, 2016
    Japanese nuclear power operator said Friday it would decommission an ageing reactor because of the cost of upgrading, the sixth to be scrapped due to tougher rules brought in after the Fukushima disaster.
    Only two are on line after passing the tests, while power companies have already announced plans to scrap at least five other old reactors.
    Shikoku Electric Power had planned to restart the No. 1 reactor at Ikata nuclear complex in Ehime, western Japan, but said Friday it would decommission the 39-year-old technology instead."
    http://www.nuclearpowerdaily.com/reports/Japan_utility_to_scrap_reactor_over_heavy_safety_costs_999.html

  • freebywill

    US_NPP Columbia 2 (WA) MANUAL SCRAM FOLLOWING LOSS OF REACTOR CLOSED COOLING http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160329en.html#en51826

    "At 1322 PDT on Monday, March 28, 2016, Columbia Generating Station was manually scrammed from 100% thermal power due to the loss of Reactor Closed Cooling (RCC). Manual scram of the unit is procedurally required upon loss of RCC. The cause of the loss of RCC is being investigated.

    "Regulation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) requires reporting within 4 hours of any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical.

    "All control rods were fully inserted. Valve RWCU-V-4 automatically closed upon high water temperature due to loss of RCC flow. No other safety system actuations were reported. All systems operated as expected. Reactor decay heat is being removed via bypass valves to the Main Condenser. The station is in normal shutdown electrical lineup.

    "The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."

    No safety/relief valves lifted and no emergency core cooling systems injected following the reactor scram.

  • freebywill

    US_NPP Catawba (SC) FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A LICENSEE SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEE http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160329en.html#en51824

    A non-licensed, licensee supervisory employee had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended.

    The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

    [ no info atm on the persons function at the plant, as non-licensed he's not an operator, could be a supervisor of a repair crew or other type of support function ]

  • freebywill

    ABANDONED RADIUM 226 SOURCE FOUND http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160329en.html#en51805

    The following was received from Pennsylvania via email:

    "Lost or abandoned licensed material in a quantity greater than or equal to 1000 times the Appendix C quantities in part 20, reportable as per 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i).

    "A new owner of a facility in Collingdale, Pennsylvania came across a locked room that contained an old lead pig, stamped with a label stating radium-226, 100 mg. The owner contacted Ecology Services, a local radioactive waste management company, who confirmed a dose rate outside the pig. Ecology Services called the Department [PA Bureau of Radiation Protection].

    "The previous occupant of this facility, Universal Technical Equipment Inc., was licensed by the Department (PA-0187) to possess up to 110 mCi of Ra-226 sealed sources and contracted the removal of the radium source. The Certificate of Disposition documentation was submitted to the Department for license termination. The license was ultimately terminated on January 14, 2015.

    "[PA Bureau of Radiation Protection] Southeast regional inspectors visited the facility today, March 18, 2016, and verified there is a source within the locked pig. A smear test revealed no leakage was detected on the outside of the pig. The source remains in a secured and locked location. More information will be provided upon receipt."

    PA incident # PA160011

  • freebywill

    US_NPP Prairie Isand (MN) FITNESS FOR DUTY – PROHIBITIED ITEM IN THE PROTECTED AREA http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160401en.html#en51840

    "On 3/31/2016 at approximately 0342 CDT, a worker within the Protected Area self-reported a can of beer had been packed in the worker's lunchbox. The worker reported after opening the can and taking a sip it was discovered to be a beer. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(1).

    "The worker notified Security who immediately escorted the worker from the Protected Area and disposed of the beer. The worker is not an Operator or a Supervisor. The investigation of this event is in progress.

    "The public health and safety are not impacted.

    "The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."

    [" The worker reported after opening the can and taking a sip it was discovered to be a beer. " too funny, he had to take a sip first, must have been an unmarked can ]

  • freebywill

    US_NPP Davis Besse 1 (OH) DEGRADED CONDITION DUE TO DISCOVERY OF PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160401en.html#en51837

    "On March 30, 2016, at 1715 EDT, with the Unit shutdown and in Mode 6 for refueling, evidence of leakage was identified on a 3/4-inch flexible braided piping connection on Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) 1-1, and this issue was determined to be reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage. This flexible piping is for RCP 1-1 first stage seal cavity vent line, and is categorized as ASME Section III Class 2 piping. The leakage was identified due to the discovery of a small amount of boric acid (approximately 1/2 teaspoon) on the welded end connection of the flexible piping. No active leakage was identified at the time of discovery with the Reactor Coolant System depressurized and approximately 110 degrees F.

    "Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.13, 'RCS Operational Leakage,' does not apply in the current plant condition (Mode 6). The cause and resolution of the leakage are under evaluation. This event is reportable within 8 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

  • freebywill

    US_NPPs Refueling Start Schedule for the week of 4/9 to 4/16

    Palo Verde 1……….(AZ)….04/09/16
    Millstone 3………..(CT)….04/10/16
    Salem 1……………(DE)….04/10/16
    Farley 2…………..(AL)….04/10/16
    Nine Mile Point 2…..(NY)….04/11/16

  • freebywill

    Did Beaver Valley experience some kind of leak back in Feb ?

    from this EN posted today which is a retraction of the original report
    ( a retraction is when they decide that they told the NRC something they weren't required to tell them, it doesn't mean it didn't happen )

    http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160405en.html#en51712

    " further engineering evaluation has determined the identified in-leakage does not result in >>> exceeding the design criteria for dose <<< to the control room personnel. "

    BV2 was shutdown on Feb 3 " for an unrelated planned maintenance outage " and was down until Feb 11.

    The reactor status reports just state " MAINTENANCE OUTAGE "

  • freebywill

    US_NPP Limerick (PA) COOLING TOWER WATER RELEASED TO A NON-PERMITTED OUTFALL http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160405en.html#en51847

    "Notified the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection that Limerick Cooling Tower water was released to a non-permitted outfall through the spray pond (Ultimate Heat Sink) due to system lineups associated with emergent maintenance activities. There was no radioactive material contained within the water released. Corrective actions are being taken to prevent further release via this outfall."

    The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. [ as soon as they can find him ]

  • freebywill

    US_NPP Brunswick (NC) @ 95% EMPLOYEE FATALITY http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160406en.html#en51848

    "This is a non-emergency four hour notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).

    "At approximately 0908 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on April 5, 2016, an employee developed a personal medical condition in the Protected Area at the Brunswick Nuclear Plant. The Brunswick County Sherriff and local Emergency Medical Services were notified and they responded and attempted to resuscitate the unresponsive employee. These efforts were unsuccessful and the individual was declared deceased at approximately 0950 EDT on April 5, 2016. The fatality was not work related and the individual was inside of the Radiological Controlled Area and was not contaminated. No news release by Duke Energy is planned.

    "Notifications to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration are planned.

    "The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

  • freebywill

    US_NPP Browns Ferry 3 (AL) @ 91 % UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO MAIN STEAMLINE HIGH HIGH RADIATION CONDITION http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160407en.html#en51850

    At 1545 CDT on 04/06/16 Browns Ferry Unit 3 declared and exited the declaration of an unusual event due to a main steam line high high radiation condition.
    Power to Unit 3 was reduced to 91 percent power.
    The high radiation condition alarm cleared at 1526 CDT.
    Browns Ferry Unit 3 reported that the high radiation conditions were due to resin intrusion from the condensate demineralizers into the reactor and

    >>> hydrogen water chemistry <<< [ overheating going on ? ]

    was a potential contributor to the event.
    The cause is still under investigation.

    * * * UPDATE FROM BILL BALL TO DANIEL MILLS AT 0034 EDT ON 04/07/2016 * * *

    "At 1941 [CDT] BFN [Brown's Ferry] determined this notification to be potentially newsworthy due to receiving notification that counties [surrounding the plant] were alerted of this event. No plant conditions changed."

    The licensee may issue a press release.

  • Max Sievert Max Sievert

    The Tennessee Valley Authority activated the lowest of four emergency notifications Wednesday afternoon when high radiation levels were detected in a main steamline at the newest reactor at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant in Alabama. TVA detected the high radiation condition around 3:35 p.m., central daylight time, on Wednesday. But the notice of an unusual event was cleared almost immediately. TVA spokesman Jim Hopson said the high radiation levels were quickly lowered to acceptable levels and there was no risk of radiation exposure or… http://hisz.rsoe.hu/alertmap/database/index.php?pageid=event_desc&edis_id=NC-20160408-52843-USA

  • freebywill

    US_NPP Millstone 3 (CT) @ 20 @ SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DETERMINED TO BE INOPERABLE DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160411en.html#en51860

    "During pre-planned surveillance testing of the Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System (SLCRS), an issue was found affecting the Secondary Containment boundary. Millstone Unit 3 is being moved to Mode 5 for a refuel outage where investigation and repairs will be made. This is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function for systems or structures to control the release of radioactive material, and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) to mitigate the consequences of an accident."

    The surveillance testing was being performed while Millstone 3 was being removed from service for an upcoming Refueling Outage.

  • freebywill

    US_NPP DC COOK 1;2 (MI) OIL LEAK IN A SWITCHYARD TRANSFORMER OIL SYSTEM http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160411en.html#en51859

    "At 1657 EDT on April 8, 2016, an oil leak developed from the station's switchyard transformer no. 4. Approximately 25,000 gallons of oil has leaked within the transformer's containment berm. At 1820 EDT on April 8, 2016, DC Cook environmental personnel determined that

    >>> approximately 2000 gallons of oil had leaked outside of the containment berm onto the ground. <<<

    None of the oil has made it to any nearby drains. Leak has stopped and cleanup is ongoing. D.C. Cook has notified the State of Michigan and local authorities. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

    [ no info atm on whether this oil contains pcb's ]

    [ unit 1 was at day 17 of a typical 45 day refueling run and is defueled, unit 2 is at full power ]

  • freebywill

    US_NPP Part 21 naming 10 plants POTENTIALLY UNQUALIFIED COMPONENT IN CERTAIN ALLEN BRADLEY TIMING RELAYS http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160411en.html#en51030

    "The timing relay model 700RTC has been dedicated/qualified for multiple applications for various plants.

    "Between 2009-2010 Allen Bradley made a design change without changing the part number of the commercial relay or providing any documented evidence of a design change. The manufacturer specification data sheets maintain the classification that the relays are 'solid state', which would imply that there are no digital devices installed in the relay. However, after inspection of the internals of the timing relay (Figure 2), it has been identified that the unit does contain a CPLD which meets the definition of a digital device under the guidance of NEI 01-01."

    Potentially affected plants include Browns Ferry, Ginna, Millstone, Nine Mile Point, North Anna, Ft. Calhoun, Perry, River Bend, South Texas Project, and St. Lucie.

  • PlowboyGrownUp

    "Thirty-five of 50 chocolate brands tested were found to contain lead and/or cadmium, many at levels that exceeded California’s safety limit
    Some of the samples contained up to nine and seven times the daily amount that California considers safe for lead and cadmium, respectively
    While the levels were low, there’s no safe level of lead exposure for children; contact your favorite chocolate brands manufacturer to find out if their products are regularly tested for lead and other contaminants" http://articles.mercola.com/sites/articles/archive/2016/04/12/lead-in-chocolates.aspx?et_cid=DM102790&et_rid=1439406474

  • freebywill

    US_NPP Palo Verde (AZ) @ 0 % REACTOR PRESSURE BOUNDAY LEAKAGE http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160412en.html#en51861

    "At approximately 2335 [MST] on April 10, 2016, while performing planned routine visual examinations of Unit 1 components in the Containment Building, engineering personnel identified white residue on the piping instrument nozzle for the reactor coolant system (RCS) 2B cold leg resistance temperature detector, 1JRCET121Y. The white residue was dry and no active leakage was noted on the instrument nozzle.

    "Preliminary chemical analysis for radionuclide and boron content of the white residue determined the existence of boron and the isotopic content was consistent with RCS fluid. At 0535 [MST] on April 11, 2016, it was determined the residue resulted from RCS pressure boundary leakage, based on results of the chemical analysis and additional examination of the piping and instrument nozzle by qualified engineering personnel. Technical Specifications Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.4.14 permits no RCS pressure boundary leakage and therefore, the discovery of leakage from the instrument nozzle represents a degradation of a principal safety barrier. This notification is being made for a degraded condition pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).

    "The unit has been shut down for its 19th refueling outage since 4/9/16 at 0000.

  • freebywill

    US_NPP Duane Arnold 1 (IA) @ 100 % [ Tritium leak ] COURTESY OFFSITE NOTIFICATION MADE TO STATE AND COUNTY OFFICIALS http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160413en.html#en51863

    [ fancy title translation – we're going to tell you before you catch us so we can minimize the press exposure ]

    "On April 12, at 1235 CDT, Duane Arnold Energy Center contacted officials with the State of Iowa (Bureau of Radiological Health and Department of Natural Resources) and Linn County Public Health Department in accordance with the nuclear industry voluntary reporting criteria contained in NEI 07-07 'Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative'.

    The site contacted the agencies as courtesy to notify them about the identification of low levels of tritium found within the site's protected area from a potential new source.

    Samples were taken, and no regulatory limits were exceeded. [ good thing the limits are wide ]

    The site team is working with industry experts on pinpointing the cause and installing an extraction well to remediate the situation. [ where will the tritiated water go ? ]

    "This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), as a result of notification to offsite agencies. [ we were trying to cover this up but we are forced to confess ]

    "The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspectors.

    "There is no risk to plant employees, the public or drinking water."

  • freebywill

    US_NPP PilGRIM 1 (MA) @ 100 % LOSS OF BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160413en.html#en51862

    "On April 12, 2016, with the reactor at 100 percent power and the mode switch in RUN, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station entered an unplanned 24-hour Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) action statement due to both emergency diesel generators (EDG) being inoperable (Technical Specification 3.5.F.1). At 0050 [EDT] this morning, with EDG B out of service for a planned LCO maintenance window, EDG A was declared inoperable due to a 130 drop per minute leak on a line to a jacket water pressure indicator.

    "Repairs to EDG A are underway at this time.

    "The following plant equipment has been verified operable: both 345 Kv transmission lines; 23kV transmission line; Station Blackout EDG.

    "This condition is reportable to the NRC Staff as an Event or Condition that Could Have prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function (Mitigate the consequences of an accident) under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), and requires an 8-hour notification.

    "The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.

    "The licensee will notify the Commonwealth of Massachusetts."

  • freebywill

    Update : ADMINISTRATIVE ITEMS RELIED ON FOR SAFETY (IROFS) NOT PERFORMED http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160414en.html#en51776

    * * * UPDATE FROM SLAMA TO SHOEMAKER ON 4/13/16 AT 1542 EDT * * *
    "Isotopic analysis has been conducted for the material in the stored drums; the uranium enrichment is characterized as depleted. As such, criticality was not possible during the operations and the as-found configuration reported in Event Notification 51776 on March 7, 2016.

    [ brief recap of what happened; workers moving drums of material didn't perform necessary checks to ensure safety. Management didn't either.
    Someone was alert enough to realize the danger and alerted everyone and a report was generated. AFTER THE FACT analysis showed there was no danger. As stated before they got lucky. All those involved collected their paychecks and were told to pay attention. No BOOM was involved . . . this time. ]

  • freebywill

    US_NPP Robinson 2 (SC) @ 100 % UNANALYZED CONDITION http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160414en.html#en51864

    [ … ] source document for the mass and energy release parameters used to determine the containment pressure and temperature response to a Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) does not adequately account for all possible single active failure scenarios in the steam or feedwater line isolation provisions.

    An active failure of a feedwater regulating bypass valve whereby the valve fails to close will increase the secondary mass available for release to the containment structure. [ to much water to the RPV ]

    This can result in a higher peak containment pressure that could challenge the containment design pressure. [ it could rupture ]

    [ hey Homer what would happen if … uh oh ]

  • bluerthanblu bluerthanblu

    Where did the Enenews webcam discussion go? The CSFP does not look like it did 6 months ago. Equipment is being moved out of the CFSP into the reactor 3 playpen and the side facing the R4 cam appears to be hollowed out with irregular spaces. This condition of the CSFP appears to be a couple months in progress, including enhanced dark steam similar to what we've seen after a reactor fire with remedial watering down of damaged fuel, plus men in white suits running up and down the CSFP, with one guy patching up the wall, much like what we saw after reactor 4 fires and repair of the wall facing the cam. How much of the fuel in the CSFP was removed and how much remains that is damaged? Does anyone know the CSFP status and it's alleged 1500 rods? Thank you!

  • freebywill

    US_NPP Comanche Peak 1 (TX) @ 100 % MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION DETECTOR DETERMINED TO BE NON FUNCTIONAL http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160420en.html#en51871

    "Until this radiation monitor can be restored, Operations has implemented compensatory measures to

    monitor main steamline 1-04 N16 Radiation Monitor for early signs of a steam generator tube leak/rupture,

    pre-brief radiation protection technicians on taking local readings with a geiger-mueller tube on main steam line 1-04

    and reporting the reading to the Control Room. "

    [ What? They planning on sending people with gc's for routine monitoring? Is that particular monitor that critical? Is there something going on that leads them to believe there's a steam gen tube problem or potential problem? ]

  • AirSepTech AirSepTech

    Interesting report today as usual, a special report this afternoon.

    http://www.suspicious0bservers.org/

  • jump-ball jump-ball

    More Fuku coverage on a non-nuclear site on tonight's C2C:http://www.coasttocoastam.com/show/2016/04/21

  • freebywill

    US_NPP Vogtle 3;4 ( building ) FITNESS FOR DUTY – CONTRACTOR SUPERVISOR ATTEMPTS TO SUBVERT FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160422en.html#en51875

    "A non-licensed supervisory contractor admitted to attempting to subvert a Fitness for Duty test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."

    [ This is a SUPERVISOR. ]
    [ How many times has this happened during construction ? ]
    [ How many subordinates has he covered for ? ]
    [ How many minute flaws are being introduced into the plant that will cause problems after startup ? ]
    [ Will the NRC investigate thoroughly ? ]
    [ Will they halt construction until a review of past work verifies it has been done properly ? ]

  • freebywill

    RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA FELL OFF TRUCK AND LATER RECOVERED http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20160422en.html#en51865

    "On April 13, 2016, the licensee reported to the Agency [Texas Department of State Health] that a radiography crew had failed to secure a QSA 880 Delta industrial radiography camera (SN: D9092), which contained a 98.7 Curie Iridium-192 source (SN: 30367G), inside their truck before leaving their facility to go to a temporary job site. The crew left the facility with the camera on the tailgate of their truck. A member of the public saw the camera in the street at an intersection approximately 100 yards from the facility. He knew what the camera was and that the licensee had a facility there. He moved the camera out of the street and into the ditch and called the licensee. The licensee responded immediately. The licensee inspected the camera and found no damage. They surveyed and confirmed the source was still in the fully shielded position. The licensee's radiation safety officer reported initial estimate is that the camera was out of their possession approximately 5 minutes and no one received any exposure above regulatory limits. The licensee will complete its investigation of the incident and will confirm or correct this initial information. Since the licensee has not yet submitted a dose assessment for the member of the public, we are making this report.

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