“Air detection teams deployed” after U.S. nuclear plant accident — “Evacuation signs were posted throughout community” — Concerns over building stability? — Worker: Worst thing to happen in 30+ years (VIDEOS)

Published: April 1st, 2013 at 10:53 am ET


Follow-up to: [intlink id=”u-s-nuclear-plant-emergency-footage-of-steam-dumps-to-atmosphere-full-extent-of-damage-unknown-additional-staff-brought-to-site-video” type=”post”]{{empty}}[/intlink]

Title: Arkansas Nuclear One Industrial Accident
Source: KUOZ – University of Ozarks
Date: Mar 31, 2013
Emphasis Added

At 1:00 in

Corey Pintado, Anchor: One employee who works at Arkansas Nuclear one states that it is the worst thing that has happened in his 30 plus year career at the nuclear power plant. Top officials of Entergy including their CEO are being brought in with their emergency response center to help assess and handle the situation. When prompted about the structural status of the building, [site VP Jeremy] Browning assures that the public is safe.

Site vice president Jeremy Browning: The fact is the building, the plant, is in a very stable configuration. […] the structure is stable.

Pintado: […] Air detection teams deployed and have determined there’s been no radiation leakage.

The Courier (h/t nobuggy): […] The area surrounding ANO was placed at emergency Level 4 because of the potential for local impact, but no call to evacuate was issued by the Arkansas Department of Health. Some evacuation signs were posted throughout the community today showing emergency evacuation routes. […]

KARK: For those who live near the Arkansas Nuclear One plant, the industrial accident is shaking up the community. Many people who live nearby are concerned about what happened. Daniel Millsaps says […] he’s scared for his own that the plant might be dangerous. “It’s terrible. It’s sad. I don’t know what to think.” News of the accident is spreading quickly. John Aksamit says he’s shocked […] Millsaps is still concerned. “It’s scary. You never know when that thing is going to go off, or when you’re going to have to evacuate.” Aksamit says it makes him feel uneasy. “No matter how much safety you have in place, accidents can happen.” […]

Watch the KARK broadcast here

Published: April 1st, 2013 at 10:53 am ET


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109 comments to “Air detection teams deployed” after U.S. nuclear plant accident — “Evacuation signs were posted throughout community” — Concerns over building stability? — Worker: Worst thing to happen in 30+ years (VIDEOS)

  • Nukites

    I don't know how old this waste generation station is, but as more effort is put into maintaining these old dinosaurs, more and more accidents are certain.

  • TheBigPicture TheBigPicture

    Dangerous to live within a hundred miles of a nuclear plant, and worse when they have problems.

  • lickerface lickerface

    Structural status of the "building" seems to be emphasized as if people will think that what they can SEE equals reactor health. With Chernobyl, we could see devastation of structure. With Fukashima, one could visually infer a disaster was unfolding. The more the media fails to consider what's potential in the steam dumps and also behind those walls (actual reactor vital details), the more the public may remain skeptical. Further attempts to focus on the structure will only cause more questions. People are fearing radionuclide exposure, not a pile of bricks or fallen concrete. How sheepish they must think we all are.

  • ftlt

    Aging plants… Odds increasing of internal failure or accident or natural disaster stress failure every day ..

    • PavewayIII PavewayIII

      Why are you posting this now? ANO's license was just renewed for 20 more years. Did you write some angry all-caps posts to Entergy or the NRC?

      • We Not They Finally

        Obviously, renewal of licenses is a cost decision, not a safety one. Shut it down and there is not only immediately no profit, but the costs of decommissioning. They figure the public won't know the difference because they are not dropping dead right away. Blunt but true.


    “No matter how much safety you have in place, accidents can happen.” Really?! Do we have permission – yet – to weigh the dangers of this technology against its destructive potential? Perhaps we should continue being patient and wait until its proponents are also dying, before we come to any hard conclusions…

    • We Not They Finally

      "Accidents," "leaks," "cracks," they're all euphemisms. If the language were changed, some of the public brainwashing might shift.

  • PavewayIII PavewayIII

    The 'air detection teams' would have been deployed by the Arkansas Department of Health. Here's the top news items on their site right now:

    April 1 – 100 Years of Public Health in Arkansas
    March 22 – Rabid Skunk Confirmed in Pulaski County
    March 20 – New Rankings Reveal Benton County Healthiest, Ouachita County Least Healthy

    See anything missing? Yeah… there's that nuclear power plant on emergency power with crushed switchgear for both it's boilers. The steam is perfectly safe. Think: TMI safe!

    • lickerface lickerface

      I'm baffled how switchgear is even able to be crushed, and why it's in the pathway of heavy machinery operations. I'm guessing a forklift was driving where it shouldn't? Something bad happened, right? Worst they've seen in 30 years is definitely something which poses immediate health risk. The current work crew probably is less than 30 years old.

      • PavewayIII PavewayIII

        This is from the mostly-useless Entergy PR: "… The accident occurred when a generator stator fell as it was being moved out of the turbine building…"

        *This* is the kind of stator they're (supposedly) talking about:


        It's the grey cylinder. The green metal on the front and back is part of the railroad car. If you wanted to see the electric generator in a power plant, they would point at the grey motor-like cylinder, which is usually mounted one floor below. In a plant, they look like this:


        The inside switchgear is in several rows of cabinets that look something like this:


        Plant designers seem particularly fond of placing them in easily-flooded locations, and placing the primary, backup and emergency switchgear together. Faith-based design, I guess…

        • HoTaters HoTaters

          PavewayIII, thank you for your excellent analysis. The diagrams are great. It makes all the difference being able to visualize what's being discussed, in concrete terms.

        • HoTaters HoTaters

          If the switchgear(s) is/are damaged, what does this mean, in terms of what happens to the plant? Total loss of control? Or what?

          • PavewayIII PavewayIII

            Well, Fukushima ultimately lost 4 reactors because they lost all their power distribution switchgear, not because the generators didn't work. There were still two 250kV lines that worked, they just blew a breaker in the Shin-Fukushima substation. Those external power lines would have been back on in hours, but the in-plant swtichgear was ruined.

            Switchgear works like a fuse box or circuit-breaker box in your house, except you would have two of them – Call them Train A and Train B – and a big switch that let you pick which one to use. The big switch and the fuse boxes are all different kinds of switchgear.

            Now say you had two separate power company's wires going to your house for safety. Each line has their own big switch that says Train A or Train B. You can turn on any fuse box from any power line in case either one goes out.

            Toss in a few more switch-boxes and emergency generators and you end up with rooms of switching gear – the cabinets in the picture – somewhere in a nuke plant.

            The Frankenstein-looking stuff outside the building also has circuit-breakers and switching gear.

            All the switchgear is used to provide (automatically) a lot of alternative ways to get power to all the equipment regardless of which power source is used or what equipment breaks down in the middle.

            Loss of a single ANO-1 switchbox should not have resulted in loss of all it's offsite power. ANO-2 is still using offsite power but has switch problems.

          • PavewayIII PavewayIII

            For ANO-1 (in refueling) you have two problems:

            1. The same situation as Fuku Unit 4 where the SPF is holding 'fresh' used fuel. The SPF will heat up rapidly if not constantly cooled. Is ANO-1 SPF OK? No idea, but Entergy says no immediate danger.

            2. The ANO-1 reactor pressure vessel is open and has fuel inside. If it still has 2/3rds of the old fuel, then there's lots of decay heat. If the water in it gets over 212F, it will boil. There's the other danger of unintended criticality. If there's not enough circulation in the open RPV to keep the extra boron suspended, it will start to settle and you might start getting more neutrons bouncing around. That always ends badly when you have the lid open.

            For ANO-2, I'm not entirely sure what's going on. It tripped during the accident, but the Emergency Feedwater system on it activated a half-hour later for some reason. Apparently, that wasn't needed and they turned it off after another half-hour (8:17 – 8:48 AM).

            The offsite power is fine and it's using that. But the event report now says, "…Unit 2 Startup 3 [transformer] lock out at 0921 [CDT]…" So something else happened at 9:21.

            Then whatever this means: "…[Bus] 2A1 is on Start up 2 [transformer] and [bus] 2A3 is on #2 EDG…"

            There are two ANO units, and both have power trains: A and B. I don't understand where 'Startup Transformer 3' fits in, why they're using 'Startup Transformer 2' for 2A3 or why the #2 EDG is involved.

        • Sickputer

          PW3…. +311

          thanks for the visuals. Just had to grimly chuckle over the train carrying caboose inscription (Do Not Hump).

          That thing (stator) certainly looks like you better not F#ck with it.

          If just a hunk of metal (huge admittedly) can wreak such havoc with a 5 billion dollar Dr. Frankenstein nuclear power building then I guess an earthquake might just send all the Ozark folks to the Promised Land. Pisses me off…I have a daughter and grand kids closer to ANO than Tokyo is to Fukushima Daiichi.

  • Dr. Anne Lee Tomlinson Maziar anne

    Aging plants, concrete weakened by radiation, and fracking causing earthquakes. Does government and corporations have any sense at all? Have they no knowledge of the history of the New Madrid Fault Line earthquakes?

    They must think their palatial getaways faraway will be safe. But there's no safe place to hide. Wake up.

  • michellemamarn

    This article states it was a crane that dropped the generator they were moving- http://www.katv.com/story/21838340/arkansas-nuclear-one-accident-injures. My question is this, if there is no danger because it's a turbine and not a reactor, why were "air detection teams" employed and evac routes publicly posted? I will never believe it was for public reassurance. Also, does anyone know if there is a difference between an "emergency level 4" and an "unusual event level"? What a world this would be if we could trust one word out of their lying, greedy mouths!

    • HoTaters HoTaters

      If you're new to the NRC event reporting, you may find the links below helpful. Others 'Newsers posted these links in the past. I made them part of my online library. You may want to do the same, so you can track NRC reporting of events at U.S. nuclear facilities. Even accidents or events involving medical equipment are required to be reported, so it' useful information.

      Here's some info. on NRC event reporting, and the assessment of accident or event levels:


      Link above gives actual reports. Link below discusses event assessment.


      • HoTaters HoTaters

        Interesting, I don't see the Event Report in the archives for event reporting at the NRC site. Why isn't this in the reports yet? Maybe they're still trying to figure out how to massage the PR and news outlet interpretation before finalzing the report?

      • RichardPerry

        HoTater, can you answer this, when they evaluate the safety of a plant, do they include the dangers of wall thinning of the tubes effect during a earth quake or do they assume no thinning of tubes in their evaluations?
        Hope you can inform me.

  • We Not They Finally

    So which is the core lie. and which are the subsequent lies? First it was just that equipment crashed down onto a few workers, but outside the reactors themselves. Now it's "emergency level 4" plus a giant oil spill? Did the "industrial accident" NOT in the reactors somehow CAUSE the oil spill which in turn caused haz-mat measures agait radioactivity? A child could see that this story MAKES NO SENSE. We just know that it can't be good or why would they be stringing the story out in such a scrambled way?

    • lickerface lickerface

      I'm confused as to the order of events. I thought the tar sands spill happened first… or so they claim?

    • tomarsandbeyond tomarsandbeyond

      If there were sabotage, it might not get reported as that. Just a thought. Its one thing that could tie those two events in the same region together. They would try to sell us some bs cover story.

  • FIRST..! THERE IS NO NORMAL MODE where "STEAM DUMPS" are a part of it !! PERIOD!

    That being said..? It sounds like they couldn't shut the gate to the turbines. So now you have the reactor SCRAM, that popped pressure valves when control rods went in.. that let go rads.. always does.

    However, rather than going back to the core, the steam is now exiting the plant from the cooling loops. IF the 2-stage loops have ANY leaks (San-O..? ) like the one in CA… then the steam will be rad-tainted.

    No matter what way you look at this..? IT IS NOT NORMAL OPERATIONS!

    "At 0750 [CDT] on 3/31/2013, during movement of the Unit 1 Main Turbine Generator Stator (~500 tons), the Unit 1 turbine temporary lift device failed. This caused a loss of all off site power on Unit 1. The ANO Unit 1 #1 and #2 EDG [Emergency Diesel Generator] have started and are supplying A-3 4160V switchgear and A-4 4160V switchgear. P-4A Service Water pump and P-4C Service Water pump has been verified running. Unit 1 has entered [procedures] 1202.007 – Degraded Power, 1203.028 – Loss of Decay Heat, and 1203.050 – Spent Fuel Emergencies. Unit 1 is in MODE 6.
    "Unit 2 tripped and is in MODE 3. Emergency Feed Water was initiated on Unit 2 and Unit 2 was in [Technical Specification] 3.0.3 from 0817 [CDT] to 0848 [CDT] due to Emergency Feedwater. Unit 2 is being powered by off-site. Unit 2 Startup 3 [transformer] lock out at 0921 [CDT]. [Bus] 2A1 is on Start up 2 [transformer] and [bus] 2A3 is on #2 EDG.

    • Unit one now has pool-cooling issues!
      Unit two is doing a feed-and-bleed to dissipate the residual core heat!

      That is… they are pumping fresh water into the cooling loops to try and suck-away the heat from the core.. as shit is MESSED UP! No main power to change settings.. and with SMASHED control board, can't even use backup generators to do so! Can't throw power into that bus!

      PRAY they DON'T spring a LEAK in the isolation cooling loops like San-O or the rads will be pumping out the place!

      This ALSO means #2 is in pool-heat-removal LACK THERE OF.!! Just like Unit 1's pool!

      Clock be ticking… tic, …. tic,… tic,….

      • PavewayIII PavewayIII

        Now? This is what the NRC is finally publishing from *yesterday's* reports. Unit one temporarily lost RHR yesterday, SPF cooling – who knows. We're still here today. Tomorrow's report should show if we die tonight or not.

        And it's too late to pray about the leaky steam tubes. They've had issues with them at ANO for a long time. I'll try to find the report.

        • Unless some new regs have been imposed and some real work done since 2011, there is no requirement for spent fuel pools to have emergency power during a loss of offsite power event. The backup RHR removal systems have been designed upon the given assumption that loss of grid power cannot last more than a few days at most. Browns Ferry (all three units) were without offsite power for 10 days after the Tuskaloosa tornados spring before last. General grid failure that goes long. Nukes were never subjected to risk-benefit analyses that considered worst case scenarios. If they'd done that, there would be no nuclear plants.

      • PavewayIII PavewayIII

        Here's your leaky steam generator tubes, PattieB. Well, in all fairness they were not actually leaking yet. The two Areva steam generators (SG A and and SG B of ANO-1) were replaced in 2005 (R19). Costed ratepayers at least a hundred million I would guess.

        The fact that some tubes had worn down 27% isn't the big issue here, though. It's the fact that during the next FOUR refueling outages (R20 – R23), multiple ANO teams either misinterpreted measurements, ignored them or changed earlier suspicious findings to 'No Degradation Found'.

        This wouldn't even have been known *now* if it wasn't for Exelon reporting to the NRC that TMI's new AREVA generators were experiencing the tube-to-tube wear problem already. The NRC told the other lucky AREVA generator users to check out their units in November, 2011.

        Poor ANO-1 had just bolted up after refueling outage R23 in October 2011. They didn't report finding anything unusual during the inspection, so they reanalyzed for excuses… er, reanalyzed the data. Oops! Yeah… darn if SG A's and B's rattling steam tubes were not in the process of wearing through eachother (undetected for FOUR outages) the same way as the AREVAs at TMI.

        I think they promised the NRC that this wouldn't happen again. Here's the slide-deck o'excuses:


        AREVA says "Sorry U.S. suckers; all E-Bay sales FINAL!"

      • patb2009

        they have NEST teams deployed, trust me it's really bad.

  • Power Reactor Event Number: 48869
    Region: 4 State: AR
    Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
    RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
    NRC Notified By: PHILLIP FORE
    HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH Notification Date: 03/31/2013
    Notification Time: 11:57 [ET]
    Event Date: 03/31/2013
    Event Time: 10:33 [CDT]
    Last Update Date: 03/31/2013
    Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
    10 CFR Section:
    50.72(a) (1) (i) – EMERGENCY DECLARED
    50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) – RPS ACTUATION – CRITICAL
    50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) – VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
    50.72(b)(2)(xi) – OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
    Person (Organization):

  • One issue NOTE: Loss of decay heat. In nuke-speak means "Loss of ability to remove decay heat" NOT that the issue of decay heat is taken care of! Nor, Gone!

    So they doing SOME stuff with gen from undamaged plants backup systems. (Generator) as the accident caused a dead-short that nixes using off-site power.

    Is it just me…? or do these plants seem to need to FEED OFF the grid, about as often as they FEED INTO the grid? So… if you figured their needs into over-all draw as nation… wouldn't removing them from service balance-out.. as then none would be FEEDING OFF the grid..?

    • HoTaters HoTaters

      No, PattieB, it's not just you. The plants are in dire need of redundant fail-safe systems. And I mean fail-safe systems five or six levels deep. The plant operators and NRC need to assume there is 100% probability of accidents in every component of the system, and operate and/or re-design around those eventualities.

      • PavewayIII PavewayIII

        Hmmm…. sounds expensive, HoTaters. Let's check with Entergy management:

        [grumble, grumble…] NOT approved!

        Oh, sorry about that. They're not big fans of whiney, little-people ratepayers or anything that costs money. Unless it's cheaply-made junk OR makes them more money somehow.

        They *do* want to know if you have any ideas for jacking up rates. They're running out of them.

  • HoTaters HoTaters

    This article says there was "no radiation involved" (from FOX news), and of course, "no danger to the public." SOP, standard lie when radiation is released into the atmosphere. Translation: don't panic, sheeple/sleeple, this is only a drill.


  • lickerface lickerface

    DEEPLY SADDENED + "no immediate danger" = zero

  • Joe Ebslap Joe Ebslap

    I finally realized, it is April Fool's Day. Is this an April Fool's joke? Or just a Fool's joke? Or just a bunch of Fools?

  • EVERY REACTOR.. no matter the type.. does a minor "BURP" of rads during a "SCRAM" It can't be helped. The pressure needs be let-go from lower end of the PCV… this is to allow the control rods to be pushed in. The core is gaining pressure and heat during a scram.. there's no way around this.. they all burp out the relief valve during a scram.

  • razzz razzz

    Arkansas Nuclear One is a PWR.

    So they dropped a component of an electrical generator and it rolled and damaged an electrical box which started a domino effect by taking out safety systems, mainly powered from the damaged electrical box causing the online core to SCRAM without normal cooling access which led to emergency makeup water being used to cool the core that can only be steamed away since recirculating water can't be done because the damaged electrical box powered normal operations and is out of action. Can't even use diesel generators because the ruined electrical box included backup circuits which are now damaged.

    So they must keep replenishing the makeup water as it steams off until they can get pumps and valves up and running to recirculated cooling water in the normal cooling loop. To do that, they have to bypass the damage electrical box circuits with new ones besides any fried wiring. Need to worry about the SFP cooling electrical circuits too?

    In the meantime, as the makeup water steams off so does any radioactive waste products that might have found their way out from the primary loop. Tritium for sure. How much 'normal' hot leakage has to take place before being abnormal?

    Is there really no cooling water circulation other than convection?

    Good luck on looking up numbered Level Events on the NRC site, #4 being the highest but is written in a list with no associated numbering. Where's Homeland Security when you need them?

  • they are bleeding the steam out the pressure-relief pipe meant to allow the steam-gate to the turbines to close. And pouring fresh water into the top-end the secondary cooling loops. (Wash-down-system) meant to clean and inspect-repair the cooling loop system.. THIS is a pressure relief!.. it's not meant to cool the damned core! This is much like replacing the big cooling tower with a 12-ft stack of auto radiators!

    They have dead-shorts.. so generator isn't doing much good. Can't put ANY power into the control bus like this! OH! and NO.. they have NO POOL COOLING at #1 OR #2 right now!

    • Good ol' Feed-n-Bleed can set up a workable convection route just fine, as long as there's feedwater to the SGs for heat removal. Deal is, they have to have control of the pressurizer relief valve or its discharge line block valve so they can open/close as necessary to maintain pressure enough to keep the RCS from boiling. And they'll need makeup flow to replace what's going out, plus a way to isolate the letdown. And they can't do it manually, the pressurizer (like the reactor and SGs) is in the containment and no one can enter if the system's running hot. If they've got no instrumentation they're up shit creek, can only control makeup/letdown and secondary feedwater manually. Try to guess when it's time to open or close. Not a happy scenario.

      So long as the core's not in a void situation (boiling) or uncovered – or God forbid still fissioning – a hydrogen explosion isn't likely. Arkansas One has the biggest damned cooling tower anybody's ever seen, so I hope they built their containments as sturdily as TMI-2's was…

    • WereAllDead

      Nothing you state is even remotely correct. First of all turbines don’t have “gates” that let steam in, they have valves. Any steam that would have been bled off wouldn’t be steam needed to close these valves. They do not and can not be operated by steam. It’s more like a hydraulic type system that opens and closes these valves on most turbines. Also, freshwater is the normal makeup source to the secondary cooling loops. Its typically municipal water that is treated with an RO type system and stored by the hundreds of thousands of gallons in multiple places at most plants. Not to mention the volume of the secondary cooling loop is huge to begin with. If for some reason this water was depleted, using regular city water wouldn’t be that big of deal, using lake water would be but I have serious doubts that this is the case or the plant would be past a notice of unusual event. Neither unit has lost capability to cool the core or spent fuel pools. Saying otherwise is inaccurate at best and more like a straight out lie.

  • razzz razzz

    If there is truly no water circulation around the rods and assemblies in the core then steam pockets will form from the decay heat and then it is only a matter of time when gasses and gas pockets begin to form causing hot spots and later on damage to the rods.

  • bwoodfield bwoodfield

    I think the key take away from this.. 'Aksamit says it makes him feel uneasy. “No matter how much safety you have in place, accidents can happen.” '.

    This is what the nuclear pushers don't seem to get. An accident at any other type of power plant can be dangerous and have ecological issues BUT is manageable and can be cleaned up. A single incident at a Nuclear power plant can cause widespread death and sickness across the entire world.

    • NoPrevarication NoPrevarication


      "I think the key take away from this…" I don't think so. The shell to keep your eyes directly on is the nuclear waste. Some is so long in decaying that it will take 6,000 generations before it can be declared safe. It was all created in one generation. There are many other problems and some are very serious but the real clincher of no more nuclear power is the nuclear waste. What right could we possibly have to dump this on future generations?

  • razzz razzz

    They are going to have to vent the primary loop eventually if this keeps up. I don't see how they can avoid it. But how are they going to inject replacement water? Radioactive releases by venting the primary loop will be considered 'necessary' and within limits.

    • they ARE doing the primary loops.. with a wash-down system.. and venting out the pressure-relief vent for the turbine gate… but, like I said.. that's like a 12-ft stack of car radiators.. not the big tower.. and can't use power to switch things..

      • I'm more worried over the fact this isn't meant to have fresh water poured over it… it's to clean the system for repairs and such, it's not meant to be vented-out of there as steam… via the turbine pipes… this is clean filtered water…? I think NOT !! They must be pumping it in.. to have enough!

      • PavewayIII PavewayIII

        Entergy has found that a seven-foot stack of car radiators is adequate and performs well within safety margins, provided they spray the radiators continuously with windshield-washing fluid in an accident. NRC has granted approval for the design changes for all existing Entergy PWR plants (along with a sneaky 15% power uprate and bonus MOX pellets).

  • razzz razzz

    The primary loop is over pressured, how are they injecting water into the primary loop to replace the releases when they have no power to run injection pumps?

    • It's a double loop system… the #1 loop goes to core.. #2 loop to tower.. between tower and loop.. the turbine… they are using inspection wash-down of #2 system to cool it. I.E. pouring water over the second system.. and venting resulting steam out the turbine pressure relief system. Running it bit backwards.. and like cooling an over-heating car with radiator drain open, cap off.. and a hose stuck in the top… on just a drizzle!

      • razzz razzz

        Yeah, that only works if the water pump is still functional. Without moving water the engine will still heat and seize up.

    • Pressurizer atop the RCS [primary], usually the A loop (don't know if this reactor has two or four SGs). Overheating causes overpressurization, the relief valve atop the pressurizer (known as a PORV, Pressurizer Overhead Relief Valve) opens to vent pressure. Trick is to keep enough pressure to keep the core from boiling the RCS water. Tricky, need fairly accurate instrumentation and they may not have it. Or control of the block valve to close the pressurizer pressure leak – instant LOCA.

      The secondary steam loop takes steam to the turbines, a supposedly 'clean' water loop but inevitable tiny leaks in the SG tubing means it's got some contamination. Which is why they have polishers/demineralizers stocked with resins to remove said contaminates. In an emergency the polishers are supposed to isolate, leaving the heat exchange loop running unfettered. That loop's overpressure is vented outside the containment via the Main Steam Dump Valves.

      Water for the secondary steam loop comes out of the lake, or can be made to do so manually by opening some valves. Virtually inexhaustible supply. primary loop is added via the makeup tanks in the aux building. If they can isolate the letdown lines, this will ensure there's enough water to cover the core even if quite a lot is going out the pressurizer. Until the tanks run dry, that is.

      • PavewayIII PavewayIII

        ANO-2 is a Combustion Engineering plant: two steam generators, four reactor coolant pumps, a pressurizer, and an awesome thumper stereo with gigantic speakers.

  • NoNukes NoNukes

    Bobby1 on April 1, 2013 at 2:42 pm said:
    This radiation reading in northern Virginia…last night was over a 1,000 times normal…


    I just went outside for a bit, I started to get a metal taste in my mouth. This doesn’t happen anymore… or I thought it didn’t till now.

    • lickerface lickerface

      The jetstream seems to flow south of there from the plant. Can anyone else here living in northern VA confirm this?

      • Wreedles Wreedles

        I live maybe 60 kilometers from that orange circle showing 21,646.

        My counter has been reading about what it always does. Around 25 – 35 CPM.


  • That's rads… classic tell..

  • yohananw

    more specific event number address to NRC Event Notification URL

    as always also see wiki:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arkansas_Nuclear_One#Incidents

    above citation adds on to above nrc event quotes of HoTaters and PavewayIII

    also no mention of local radition detection in the event note…

  • yohananw

    as usual ENENEWS headline is alarmist: "evacuation signs posted" but as explained in the text these are only some preparedness signs showing emergency evacuation routes.

  • yohananw

    google search tip re:Razz how to look up the NRC event emergency classification numbers.
    google::> "event levels site:.nrc.gov "
    which brings top hit, http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/emerg-preparedness/about-emerg-preparedness/emerg-classification.html
    (the google <advanced search> tips explains handy site: domain search)

    as for the unit2 steam, as PattieB noted it's only scram steam, normal incremental operating fallout…
    nrc event note:>"On Unit 2, all rods inserted during the trip. The core is being cooled via natural circulation. Decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to atmosphere. There is no known primary to secondary leakage."

    • razzz razzz

      yohananw: Since you have no qualms with NRC's reporting, why don't you fill us in on how Unit 2 went from SCRAM with no power to circulate cooling water to emergency measures for cooling the primary and secondary loops which included venting steam directly to the atmosphere because the tower cooling was inoperable and the core was cooling itself via convection (get a clue).

      Then you can explain what "There is no known primary to secondary leakage." means to you. I am sure the guys who were putting up evacuation signs and notices were prompted by alarmists.

      Keep in mind the damage electrical box took out most of the plant and what followed isn't in the manual of operational procedures.

      My guess, it will be months or years before we find out what the results are. But a good hint will be how long it takes Unit 2 to come back on-line.

  • We Not They Finally

    O.k., shocker: Googled the arkansas nuclear accident, many different ways, with and without dates, and came up with NOTHING. Earlier in the day, at least got sketchy info from here and there, and it had goggled right to the top, but now NOTHING. Is this as freaky as it looks? Hoping that I am somehow mistaken and this is NOT a blackout of any news.

  • Dr. Anne Lee Tomlinson Maziar anne

    UPDATE: Federal Inspectors Investigate Fatal Accident at Arkansas Nuclear Plant
    April 01, 2013,

    “The accident occurred when a crane dropped a piece of equipment called a generator stator that weighs about 500 tons, according to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. When the generator stator fell, it damaged other equipment and a water pipeline used for extinguishing fires. Water spilled from the pipeline into the building that contains the power turbine, the NRC said. The water seeped into an electrical component, causing a short-circuit that cut off power to the plant from the electric grid, according to Entergy and the NRC.
    “The worker who was killed was Wade Walters, 24 years old, of Russellville, Ark., according to Pope County Coroner Leonard Krout. Mr. Krout declined to provide details about Mr. Walters' death, saying an autopsy and completion of an official death certificate were still pending.
    “Emergency diesel generators were providing electricity to both reactors Monday, said Victor Dricks, a spokesman for the NRC. Mr. Dricks said that two NRC inspectors were on site, and two were on their way to the facility, to examine the circumstances that led to the accident….”
    Read more: http://www.nasdaq.com/article/update-federal-inspectors-investigate-fatal-accident-at-arkansas-nuclear-plant-20130401-00807#ixzz2PGMfZxwp

  • Ariana

    Oh please, please everyone go read the comments to this article! They are absolutely ridiculous! Especially the "Charanobal" comment. http://rt.com/usa/arkansas-nuclear-plant-accident-170/comments/page-3/

    • michellemamarn

      @ Ariana- Had to check it out. You are right…ridiculous. Except for two good points- 1)Maintainance at 7 a.m. on Easter morning does sound fishy and 2) Why was the running generator being moved in the first place?

      • Ariana

        Yeah, why would they do maintenance on Easter morning unless there was already something wrong? Maybe they really needed to get a generator in there quickly?! In that case, there would have been an accident anyway.

        • michellemamarn

          What about that switch gear?? Generator stator?? 3 people, 8 people? AND hbjon mentions above here that radnet shows previously elevated, "scary high" readings in Little Rock. The press releases FORCE us to worry. I have family near there, very near, and advised them to shelter in place until more is clear.

    • The stupidity of those comments is amazing.

  • byron byron

    Only one AR plant shown on radiationnetwork.com website. Is this the NPP? East of AR on Mississippi River the reporting station has been reporting low. Should we watch that website for readings, perhaps? Or is it compromised? What direction is the wind blowing? That needs to be monitored also.

  • wildcat

    This is the first time I have ever visited this site or commented on the ridiculous comments. PattieB has absolutely no idea what he/she is saying. Although you appear to have some limited knowledge of how a power plant works you are spewing absolute lies about ANO and nuclear power plants in general.

  • wildcat

    PattieB, Why are you doing that? Are you trying to advocate a cause for not having nuclear power? Are you just scared or just ignorant? Either way stick to the facts.

    ANO unit 2 never at any time lost all offsite power and has offsite power restored. Unit 2 never lost spent fuel pool cooling. Unit 1 lost spent fuel pool cooling for minutes. ANO unit 1 lost core decay heat cooling for less than 3 minutes before it was restored by a highly trained staff!

    • That's complete BS !! When pressed on the matter, the NRC even ADMITTED IT ! Who's playing ADVOCATE for NRC & Nuclear!>???

      • WereAllDead

        No Pattie, Wildcat is exactly correct. These plants have multiple sources of off site power, at least one of which unit two lost, and at least one of which it never did.

        As for Unit one:
        Here is some real knowledge about a plant for Pattie B and anyone else who cares to learn. The emergency electrial is normally powered inderectly from the generator, or if the plant is down then it is powered from off site power. If being powered from the generator during a plant trip, there will be a transfer to off site power. These transfers happen so fast you probably wouldn't even notice the lights flicker. However, if off site power is lost, the emergency diesels will start. When the diesels are up to normal speed, then the emergency switchgear will close one at a time to prevent an instantaneous overload of the diesel. This process losing power, starting a diesel, and closing breakers one at a time takes a couple minutes. This small amount of time is most likely how long Unit 1 lost Decay Heat and Spent Fuel Pooling cooling. This place isn't flooded like Fukushima. They would have backup equipment in place by now even if everything I said wasn't ture. Not to mention, if Unit 1 has been in a refueling outage for a week to 10 days when this happened, the fuel pool and reactor are now tied together with one massive body of water that has hundreds of thousands of gallons of water. Maybe 500,000+. It would take an unreal amounnt of time to boil that off. PattieB, get a…

  • wildcat

    And BTW, the comments that were made about doing maintenance on Easter Sunday were funny. During a refueling outage power plants work 24/7 regardless of the holiday or day of the week. And yes the industrial accident happened on Easter day at 0745.

  • wildcat

    Thanks for the back up WereAllDead. You are right that the fuel tranfer canal was and is flooded in preps for core offload. PattiB stick to the facts. The NRC never admitted to the fact that Unit 2 lost all offsite power. Because its not true. And yes ANO has a half dozen diesel generators on site now just in case and will be using some of them to provide non vital power while the damaged switchgear is repaired/replaced.

    • WereAllDead

      I figure since reactor voiding a pool boiling hasn't occured, all those on here that were blowing smoke about things they have no clue about are probably on to the next incident so they can blow it out of proportion with lies and crazy assumptions to support their agenda.

      People fear what they don't know. I think very few people on here if anyone understands:
      1) How a nuke plant works.
      2) What happened in this incident and how plant design prevented it from being worse.

      I don't mind those that are anti-nuke, I mind those that base it on ignorace and lies and spread the same.