Tepco Official on Unit 3: “We don’t know if it was really a hydrogen explosion”
Statement of Tepco Executive Akio Takahashi recorded 30 minutes after the explosion at Reactor No. 3 on March 14, 2011 translated by Fukushima Diary:
“We don’t know if it was really a hydrogen explosion, but because the government, Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency said it was a hydrogen explosion, let’s announce it was a hydrogen explosion. They’re trying to say it was the same explosion but different reactor number, aren’t they.”
See also:
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- Asahi: Video shows Tepco’s hastiness when reporting Unit 3 as a hydrogen explosion — Cause “has yet to be determined” August 8, 2012
- Tepco: We don’t know if it was a hydrogen explosion at Unit 3 — Tell public it was though because “it’s a speed game” (VIDEO) October 8, 2012
- Reactor Specialist on Unit 3: “I can’t tell you if it’s a hydrogen explosion or a nuclear explosion” (VIDEO) August 24, 2012
- Real severe problem cooling Unit No. 3 reactor — Hydrogen explosion possible (VIDEO) May 13, 2011
- “Mysterious circumstances” of explosion at reactor No. 3 — Cannot be explained by a simple hydrogen build-up April 26, 2011
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Well, the photos show the third reactor building where concrete pillars of abt. 4×4 feet, are cracked like matches. And one third of the building is gone, and the rest is just rubble.
The explosion was felt 25 miles away. (40 km)
It is clearly not just a gas explosion like in no. 1 and 2.
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It clearly was a nuclear explosion at #3
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Not a nuclear explosion, check out Ian Goddard's information, it's the likeliest and means that parts of the nuclear fuel were spewed out of both primary and secondary containments.
Going nuclear on the explanations based on one's assumptions and gut feelings doesn't do the project of cutting through the BS and revealing the truth about this any help and it discredits anti-nuke people (like us).
On the other side, at least the PTB are finally having to admit it wasn't an H2 explosion.
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A prompt localized criticality is still a nuclear event.
It is the precurser to a prompt generalized criticality.
The difference is, one is self sustaining, the other is not.
And I agree, as seen in the old military "playin'in the nuclear sandbox" videos, a prompt localized criticality has enough energy, to reject anything near it in proportion to the energy released.
And that doesen't even matter at all after one blows sky high, for whatever reason.
It blew up, containment is null…
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Point taken, I meant the explosion(s) wasn't/weren't driven purely by fission though it may have occurred during.
As commented on below, there may be problem's with IG's theory; but it explains a lot others don't. And the facet of the issue I'm focusing on is TEPCO etc calling it an H2 explosion to cover up that it's very likely part of the core was expelled into the atmosphere.
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I had one big problem with Ian Goddards film, He forgot to mention that the concrete biological shield plug for reactor 3 is still in place. For that much hot gas and material to exit the containment it had to exit from somewhere and nobody has yet to show me where that hole is. Bare in mind that this hole needs to be big enough to drive a bus through not just some leaking crack. I contacted Ian several times on this matter and, has yet, have not receive a reply.
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"the concrete biological shield plug for reactor 3 is still in place"
Is there any way to substantiate that statement, a better than grainy image please.
I remember two concrete biological shield plug size holes in the turbine buildings adjacent to #3…
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If you look on Ian Goddard's site he goes over a hi-res picture of R3 and zooms in and comments on what he thinks he is seeing.
If you saw the holes in the roof you would also have seen the fuel bundle shaped objects nearby, if you can find the thermal images of the turbine building roof you will also see that these bundles are still hot 3 days after the explosion (self heating). These fuel bundles cannot be from the reactor because they had already melted down, the only other fuel bundles where in the fuel pool.
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http://www2.galcit.caltech.edu/~jeshep/fukushima/japan_earthquaketsu_fukushima_daiichi1_march16_2011_dg.jpg
Want to know where the holes in the shield plug are? Follow the twin columns of steam you can see in this pic from the 16th.
I think the reason the plug didn't blow clean off was the fact that the refueling crane was parked directly over it.
http://everist.org/archives/Fukushima/aerial-2011-3-30-unit3.jpg
The what is left of the ceiling girders you see laying over the rubble were shielded by the crane you see directly under them.
The pressure blew the PCV plugs in the reactor building.
http://ex-skf.blogspot.com/2012/04/mind-gap-in-fukushima-reactor-3.html
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What really happened at Fukushima? via A Green Road http://agreenroad.blogspot.com/2012/02/what-really-happened-at-fukushima.html
How Dangerous Is 400-600 Pounds Of Plutonium Nano Particle Dust Liberated By Fukushima? Via A Green Road http://agreenroad.blogspot.com/2012/03/how-dangerous-is-400-600-pounds-of.html
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Yes ..nuclear…
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What a criminal act these nuclear power programmes- the very epitome of ignorance where the truth can be swamped under a tissue of statements which can only be proved by as yet uninvented instrumentation and repeatability(my God!)of what happened.
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We demand a third party investigation before the evidence is removed or destroyed. After one and a half years, we still don't know what happened at Building3 (or Buildings1,2,&4). The world deserves to know what happened here. It would also be acceptable to shut all nukes down immediately. But, if the nuke industry intends to operate these unstable, problematic death machines, shouldn't the failure mode of Fuku3 be thoroughly studied in order to avoid having a similar nuke failure elsewhere?
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They = NISA
Tepco “We don’t know but let’s say reactor3 had a hydrogen explosion because NISA said so.”
http://fukushima-diary.com/2012/08/tepco-we-dont-know-but-lets-say-reactor3-had-a-hydrogen-explosion-because-nisa-said-so/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+FukushimaDiary+%28Fukushima+Diary%29
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http://www.democracynow.org/shows/2012/1/24
For those who enjoy saving links to good info. Covers some books, movies (documentary), history, interviews (including Robert Redford).
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So, after a year and a half, the owners, operators, various governments, and regulatory agencies are clueless.
I would believe any ENEnewsianite before the others anyhow.
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These ill conceived monsters have a number of design flaws.
The piece of equipment that separates the high side from the low side is the condenser. The condenser tubes separate the boiling water from the cooling water. IMO if the main circulators or piping that supplies water to the condenser fails a meltdown can occur. The cooling water condenses the steam on the high side. No cooling water no condensation of the steam in the condenser. Steam replaces the water in the reactor, circulating pump, and piping. Since this is a saturated closed cycle-no superheat-temperature and pressure are joined at the hip. As the pressure goes up temperature goes up. As pressure goes down temperature goes down. Pressure goes up because the reactor cannot be immediately shut down. Heat is still being supplied to a constant volume. If the circulator to the reactor or piping fails, the coolant to reactor is lost. This pump pulls condensed water out of the condenser and drives it back into the reactor.
It appears the reactors have a remote safety relief system. Loss of power means loss of relieving reactors. IMO this should have been a conventional spring load safety valves.
Even if the safety relief valves open, they discharge into the containment vessel which will not contain due to the flanged gasket at top. The joint was probably designed properly but was in the wrong application.
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Steel and zirconium have a design limit of about 800 degF to 1000 degF. As pressure increases, the reactor will fail because the pressure exceeds the maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP). Zirconium will fail due to high temperature and these are tubes with very thin wall thickness. GE bumped right up against the line. No margin of safety. IMO it looks like GE set the operating pressure of the BWR using the zirconium tube designed to the yield which is not code practice.
All emergency generators except one were water cooled. There must have been cooling water pumps for the diesels. Loss of power means loss of cooling to pumps. Failed piping means loss of cooling to diesels. Diesels trip due to high temperature. If it takes four generators for emergency power, how did GE expect one air cooled generator to carry the load?
The water circulators to the condensers are probably located close to the sea. Keep the suction short. With the sea bed moving up or down 4 – 5 feet, we know the piping gave up. No one has said anything about material. On sea water systems such as condenser water it is not uncommon to use fiber reinforced pipe (FRP). In this case all bets are off.
These are issue we can see around here. What other design problems are lurking that YAPCO has been covering up.
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You can design all you want around an inherently dangerous failed technology. Still, it is what it is. We are not mature enough, as a collective species, to have even a tiny portion of the stars, at our disposal. It should not have been resurrected on earth…
Everything about nuclear, from top to bottom, is a loss for all life. A negative net effect. It's time.
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